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I. PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND PREVIEW
A. THE PROBLEM
In the late fall of 1991, CDR John Corbett, Director of
Warehousing Division, Defense Distribution Depot Oakland
(DDOC) , was faced with an impasse concerning Oakland's
continued viability as a stock point. Specifically, CDR
Corbett periodically reviewed Oakland's requisitioning
histories and conducted random samples of Issue Priority Group
I (IPG I) requisitions received. His analysis revealed a
disproportionate amount of IPG I requisitions relative to
other Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) stock points in Central
California. These IPG I requisitions were a principal cause
of Oakland's higher cost to issue material when compared to
nearby Defense Depots in California's central valley. CDR
Corbett felt these costs may tip the scales in favor of
eliminating Oakland as a DLA stock point and transferring its
inventories to the San Joaquin Valley (Corbett '91) .
In essence, CDR Corbett was faced with several DLA
alternatives. These choices included: (1) subjectively
downgrading requisitions he believed did not meet IPG I
criteria; (2) assisting his most prolific IPG I customers to
build inventories of the materials they ordered the most as
IPG I; and (3) imposing penalties in the form of surcharges
on IPG I requisitions to recoup his additional costs to fill
these requirements . CDR Corbett was concerned about the
effects of this proposed surcharge on his customers. He
requested a study of the second and third alternatives as a
thesis conducted by inventory and logistics masters degree
students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This thesis will examine the effects of a DLA IPG I
requisitioning surcharge on ordering decisions and inventory
management by retail activities. It will construct a logical
framework within which an efficient decision maker can weigh
all pertinent issues and find an optimal compromise. This
framework could also be used by wholesale activities to
determine the effects of contemplated surcharge policy changes
on retail customers prior to implementation. Wholesale
activities may be able to extrapolate an approximation of
income at various surcharge levels and combinations. These
approximations could be of use in designing surcharge programs





Data was collected from three stock points in Defense
Distribution Region West (DDRW) : Naval Supply Centers (NSC)
Oakland and San Diego, and DDRW Sharpe facility. Oakland was
chosen as it was the originator of the study proposal and for
its proximity to Monterey and NPS . To validate Oakland's
analysis San Diego was added. Finally, the former Sharpe Army
Depot, DDRW Sharpe, was queried to enable testing with
predominantly non-Navy data.
Each activity was asked to provide requisition histories
for all IPGs from 1 June 1991 through 30 May 1992. There were
several reasons why this particular period was chosen. First,
by the end of May 1991 three months had elapsed since the
conclusion of Operation Desert Storm. This three-month period
allowed the glut of requisitions accumulated during Desert
Storm to pass completely through the supply system. During
the Gulf War, the Defense Supply System was inundated with
unique IPG I requirements. In war, operational needs clearly
dominate decision makers' thoughts; neither DLA nor their
retail customers would be concerned with the effects of a
surcharge. To attempt to analyze the effects of IPG I
surcharges on retail customers using data gathered under these
conditions would present a misleading picture and result in
erroneous conclusions.
Second, to attempt to analyze data from the period
leading up to the Gulf War build-up could also be misleading.
DLA began experimenting with methods to implement the proposed
stock point consolidation initiative, Defense Management
Review Directive (DMRD) 902, during the summer of 1990 using
central California (Oakland, Sacramento, Stockton area) as a
test site. Therefore, Oakland and Sharpe data for that time
period may have reflected the confusion associated with the
extensive organizational changes. In addition, during this
period San Diego continued to operate entirely independently
as an NSC under Navy control. The use of San Diego data from
this period could lead to conclusions based upon circumstances
no longer applicable. Finally, if the collection period was
set to start later than May 1991, it might have been
difficult to collect a complete year's data for analysis.
Oakland and San Diego were able to provide real data for
the entire year requested by using their Uniform Automated
Data Processing System for Stock Points (UADPS-SP) generated
Demand History Files (DHF) and Requisition Status Files (RSF)
.
The data tapes provided by both NSCs' were based on the first
sixty-four columns of the standard UADPS-SP RSF layout.
Additional requested information was appended to this format
in column numbers sixty-five through ninety-three.
Sharpe was only able to supply data from 1 January through
25 August 1992. They were also unable to supply data in UADPS-
SP format. Instead, data was provided in Sharpe 's Material
Release Order (MRO) History program layout. Fortunately, the
required information could be extracted from this 205-column




The framework developed in this thesis assumes the
deterministic Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) demand-based
inventory equation as if inventories are to be held by
customers (Tersine '88) . Therefore, it will not attempt to
address non-demand based inventory strategies on an individual
retail customer level such as Consolidated Shipboard Allowance
Lists (COSALs), Aviation Consolidated Allowance Lists
(AVCALs), Consolidated Shore Based Allowance Lists (COSBALs),
and Tables Of Allowances (TOAs)
.
Many of the demands submitted by industrial activities may
be job dependent, but, short of a thorough submittal review,
there is no method of differentiating dependent from
independent demands. As a result, this surcharge model
assumes all demands are independent.
This model assumes all demand to be known and constant.
The demand data bases provided by each stock point contained
IPG I demands for only nine months (Sharpe) and only one year
(Oakland and San Diego) and may not be indicative, as
assumed, of annual demand during subsequent years. In
reality, demand for an item is a random variable having some
probability distribution associated with it. Unfortunately,
one year's worth of data was insufficient to develop such a
distribution.
b. Lead Time and Requisition Splitting
The lead times are assumed to be known and constant.
Historical data does not provide information on the actual
lead times. Actual receipt information is usually only-
retained by the requisitioner in their receipt file. Order
and shipping time goals are specified by the Uniform Material
Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) . Therefore, lead
times were assumed to be known and constant at the goals
specified by UMMIPS. Fortunately, neither the TVC nor the
EOQ equation used in the model requires an explicit lead time
value
.
All units of an order are assumed to be added to inventory
at the same time. Supply centers will occasionally split or
partially fill a customer's requisition. When splitting
occurs, the customer's document number is divided into two
requisitions by attaching single-digit suffixes to the
document number to identify each half of the order. Because
each supply center used suffix codes for a variety of
purposes, to include requisition splitting in the model would
have required identifying partial requisitions through audit
of each depot's demand history. The surcharge model,
therefore, assumes no requisition splitting. This assumption
should be valid since ordering activities are required to take
custody of all units in an order when it is received.
c. Costs
A fixed cost structure is assumed and, for the military
supply system, this is valid. Order costs are the same
regardless of lot size for most retail activities. There are
no quantity discounts. The surcharge model does, however,
allow order costs to be varied by individual UIC, and holding
cost rates to be varied by Cog or fund code. Holding cost
rates are applied per service directive as a linear function
based on material type (GAO/NSIAD-92-112 )
.
The last cost assumption is that each activity has
sufficient capital to procure the annual demand. In addition,
to determine if each of the customers identified in each data
base had adequate capacity to maintain the requisitioned items
in an inventory on site would have required an in-depth study
of each activity. Such studies are beyond the scope of this
thesis. Activities using this model should be intimately
familiar with their own in-house capabilities. They would
easily be able to determine if holding inventories were
feasible. Thus, the model does not include provisions for
capital or capacity constraints.
d. Other Assumptions
Several other assumptions were also made in developing the
thesis model. Depot requisition histories do not identify
which IPG I requisitions were submitted for items already
carried by the ordering activities. If items were carried,
the decision required would be how to adjust inventory levels
to respond to increased surcharge costs, not whether the
material should be stocked. Because there was no efficient
method available to determine from the depot data bases which
requisitions were for carried material, all demands were
assumed to be for items not carried.
Any decision to bring an item into stock is assumed to
not affect a requisitioner ' s non-IPG I actions. Separate
inventory decisions will be made to satisfy non-IPG I demands.
In addition, when an inventory is established for IPG I items
brought into stock, the model also assumes requisitions to
build and replenish this inventory would be submitted using
lower, non-IPG I, priorities. This assumption is consistent
with UMMIPS requisitioning policy.
The assumption is made that requisitioning activities
will behave in a manner that minimizes their material ordering
and holding costs; that is, they will follow the model.
Undoubtedly, there will be circumstances when customers
choose to pay surcharges to attain the responsiveness of IPG
I. Although the marginal cost of raising a requisition's IPG
can be determined by calculating the increase in Total
Variable Cost (TVC) , the subjective criteria a decision maker
may use in choosing to raise a requisition's priority is
impossible to determine. These circumstances can be extremely




These assumptions allow development of a relatively simple
and understandable "surcharge effects" model. In order to
relax these assumptions, the model would have grown




The next chapter will provide the background for the
remainder of the thesis. It will discuss UMMIPS IPG I
policies. This discussion will be followed by a review of
past Department of Defense (DoD) reports of requisitioning
priority abuse. The chapter will also address Oakland's
concerns in this matter. It will conclude by reviewing the
demand bases of all three depots studied in this thesis.
Chapter III will examine the options available to DLA and
their customers to address IPG I abuse. It will discuss
customer reasons for IPG I ordering, and the implications of
expanding customer inventories.
Chapter IV will discuss the development of the model used
to conduct the analysis and its application at the depot and
retail customer levels.
Chapter V will analyze the three depots' business using
A-B-C charts. Then it will present wire diagrams to
illustrate model results. Finally, it will present interval
tables for number of requisitions per stock number. This
chapter will also examine the effects of IPG I surcharges on
the top two IPG I requisitioning activities for Oakland and
San Diego.
Chapter VI will consider development of a more inclusive
model to address the implications of IPG I surcharges. This
discussion will also include a review of model inputs
required
.
Chapter VII will summarize the thesis. This summary will
be followed by conclusions and recommendations.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. ISSUE PRIORITY GROUP I
1. IPG I Policy
IPG I is DoD's highest UMMIPS requisitioning priority
group and use is theoretically limited to only the most urgent
material needs (OPNAVINST 4614. IF) . Authorization to use IPG
I is based on two criteria.
First, the requisitioner, or activity supported directly
by the requisitioner, must be in Force Activity Designator
(FAD) category I, II, or III. FAD I is reserved for those
units, projects, or forces which are most important
militarily in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
and as approved by the Secretary of Defense. FAD II is
assigned to U.S. combat, combat ready, and direct combat
support forces deployed to or operating from areas outside the
fifty states and adjacent waters, Panama, and such other
areas as may be designated by the JCS. FAD III is assigned to
all other U.S. combat ready and direct combat support forces
outside the Continental United States (CONUS) not included
under FAD II. FAD IV and below are not authorized to use IPG
I unless supporting an activity authorized a higher FAD.
Second, the need that generated the requirement must meet
criteria for requisition priorities 01, 02, and 03. These
11
priorities are reserved for immediate requirements that render
the activity unable to perform one or more of its primary
missions. For repair and industrial activities (which
normally carry a FAD of IV) , these requisitioning priorities
are also authorized when required for immediate use to
eliminate an existing work stoppage (OPNAVINST 4614. IF)
.
Except for the situation just mentioned, activities not
meeting FAD I, II, or III requirements are not authorized to
use IPG I, regardless of urgency. In addition, activities
designated in FADs I, II, and III may only use IPG I when
their needs meet the priority requirements described above.
IPG I time standards are extremely stringent at all steps
of the requisitioning process (Table I)
.
Table I. UMMIPS Time Standards
UMMIPS TIME STANDARDS
(number of days)
A. Requisition Submission 1
B. Passing Action 1
C. Availability Determination 1
D. Depot/Storage Site Processing 1
E. Transportation (CONUS & to overseas POE) 3
F. Overseas Transportation (ex. Western Pacific) 4
(Western Pacific) 5
G. Requisitioner receipt take up 1
These guidelines create additional costs for stock points.
Most of these costs are for labor as warehouse personnel are
often required to work overtime and non-regular hours. Added
costs are incurred as day-shift personnel must pick single IPG
I orders as they occur, instead of using the more efficient
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method of selecting several orders at the same time as the
picker passes through the warehouse.
2. IPG I Practices
In practice, activities may assign high priorities
inappropriately for a variety of reasons that comply with
neither the letter, nor the spirit, of the UMMIPS. For
example, the DoD Inspector General found four Naval shipyards
were routinely ordering, as high priority, material for
regular ship overhauls when required delivery dates ranged
from two and one half months to one year in the future (DoDIG
Report No. 88-118) .
CDR Corbett's random sampling of IPG I requisitions
received by Oakland led him to believe some priorities were
incorrectly assigned. IPG I requisitions were occasionally
received for large quantities of common nuts, bolts, and other
materials normally stocked by industrial activities as Pre-
Expended Bin (PEB) items. CDR Corbett felt using IPG I to
order PEB material was an indicator of poor customer inventory
management practices and an abuse of IPG I (Corbett '92)
.
Until recently, when each service controlled its own
supply system, these priority abuses were often overlooked or
tolerated. This permissive climate was radically changed when




Among the principal objectives of this consolidation was
the elimination of redundant operating capacity such as excess
warehouse space or service unique inventory management
software. The end of the Cold War added to this excess as the
military services began to downsize. In addition, DLA began
evaluating in earnest which of their activities should remain
open and which should be closed.
B. OAKLAND'S CONCERNS
As discussed earlier, one factor used by DLA in deciding
which activities to close is the cost to issue material. This
cost criterion places Oakland and other activities with a high
proportion of IPG I requisitions at a disadvantage relative to
other DLA stock points. This disadvantage is caused by the
additional costs necessary to meet IPG I response
requirements. Should DLA place significant weight on this
criteria, activities with high IPG I demand percentages would
be among the first closed.
Supply activities with higher proportions of IPG I
requisitions also tend to have higher proportions of customers
required to maintain increased degrees of readiness (FAD I,
II, or III) . To eliminate these customers' closest source of
supply may be detrimental to their ability to sustain this
required degree of readiness.
Imposition of surcharges on IPG I requisitions is one
alternative contemplated by DLA to recoup IPG I expenses and
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retain Oakland and similar activities. An additional benefit
of IPG I surcharges would be to discourage frivolous high
priority requisitions. Theoretically, legitimate IPG I
customers would be willing to pay a premium to expedite the
receipt of vitally needed material. Trivial IPG I
requisitions would be reduced or eliminated as customers would
now be faced with additional surcharge-driven costs.
These surcharges may influence retail customers to
increase inventory ranges and depths to avoid the need to
submit more costly IPG I requisitions. This decrease in IPG
I requisitions would reduce supply system stress as inventory
replenishment requisitions would not require monitoring by
both depot and customers expeditors . Finally, readiness would
be enhanced as material shortfalls were eliminated through use
of retail inventories. Remaining IPG I requisitions visible
to the system should be legitimate high priority requirements.
The quandary CDR Corbett faced can be summarized as
follows: (1) Concern for Oakland's continued viability as a
stock point would favor imposition of surcharges to reduce the
abuse and quantity of IPG I requisitions. Oakland would also
be compensated for IPG I requirements by surcharge revenues.
(2) These benefits are mitigated by concern for Oakland's
retail customers. In an era of austere funding, these
customers would be forced to pay additional costs to use IPG
I to fulfill legitimate urgent material requirements. CDR
15
Corbett submitted this problem to NPS as a prospective thesis
topic
.
C. DEPOT DEMAND BASE REVIEW
To study the impact of DLA's proposed IPG I surcharge
policy, three DDRW stock point customer bases were examined.





Defense Depot Oakland Center (DDOC) was established at the
beginning of World War II as a Naval Supply Center (NSC) . NSC
Oakland served as the principal distribution point for support
of fleet operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
During World War II, Oakland operated around the clock to
supply U.S. Forces with 28 million tons of material per year.
In the late 1960s, Oakland served as the main continental U.S.
(CONUS) source of logistical support to Vietnam. In a one-
year period, Oakland issued enough material to cover 250
football fields to a height of four feet. (DDOCPRD '92)
After the Vietnam war, NSC Oakland continued to provide
logistics support for U.S. military activities throughout the
Pacific and central California. It also became a principal
transshipment point for surface shipments to all types of U.S.
government activities throughout the Pacific.
In 1983, a state-of-the-art automated material handling
system was integrated with a computer software system into the
16
Naval Integrated Storage Tracking and Retrieval System
(NISTARS)
. This resulted in one of the most modern physical
distribution facilities in the world and served as the
prototype for the Naval Supply System.
In 1989, NSC Oakland, along with other central
California DoD Supply Activities, was designated to
participate in the DMRD 902 Supply Depot Consolidation
prototype. In June 1990, the distribution functions and
resources were transferred from the Naval Supply Center
Oakland to Defense Distribution Region West to form the
consolidation prototype. After the distribution functions
were consolidated under Defense Logistics Agency management in
1990, major Navy missions remaining at Naval Supply Center
Oakland include regional finance and contracting, personal
property, base operations, and the fuel pier at Point
Molate
.
Storage and retrieval functions in Oakland's principal
warehouse continue to be controlled by NISTARS, which is
designed to interface with NSC ' s Uniform Automated Data
Processing System for stock points (UADPS-SP) and is not
compatible with DDRW's DLA Warehousing And Shipping Procedures
(DWASP) system. To overcome this incompatibility, NSC
Oakland's UADPS-SP system is used to manage DLA materials held
in the NISTARS warehouse.
Inventory management in Oakland is also affected by the
continuing transfer of consumables from the Navy to DLA under
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DoD's Consumable Item Transfer (CIT) program (Corbett '92).
As control of this material is assumed by DLA, many line
items are being transferred from Oakland to either Sharpe or
Tracy. This physical transfer of materials to DLA, and
consolidation within DDRW facilities, is not expected to be
completed for some time to come.
b. Customer Base
Naval aviation maintenance units dominate DDOC ' s demand
base. The complete customer base in shown in Appendix A.
They are responsible for over forty-seven percent of all IPG
I requisitions received by DDOC. In addition, twenty-eight
of the top fifty IPG I ordering UICs during the period studied
are aviation units. These UICs are listed in descending
number of requisitions submitted in Table IV. Naval Aviation
Depot (NADEP) Alameda is, by a large margin, DDOC ' s most
prolific IPG I requisitioner . Its primary mission is to
perform depot level maintenance on aircraft airframes,
avionics, engines, and other systems. In addition, a
significant portion of NADEP' s workload is to recondition
Depot Level Repairables (DLRs) . DLRs are usually expensive
system components that are repaired when inoperable and
released as fully repaired and ready for use assets to the
Navy supply system.
The Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System
(UMMIPS) allows industrial activities to order using IPG I to
18
Table II. Aviation Units among Top Fifty DDOC IPG I ordering
UICs.
UIC Unit
65885 NADEP Alameda, CA
00296 NAS Moffett Field, Mountain View, CA
00334 NAS Barbers Point, HI
48758 Naval Air Pacific Repair Activity Plant
Detachment Office, Atsugi, JA
21297 USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72)
620 NAS Whidbey Island, WA
0236 NAS Alameda, CA
61577 NAS Guam, MI
62876 NAS Cubi Point, RP
09124 MALS 24, Kanoehe Bay, HI
033 62 USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62)
60200 NAS Cecil Field, Jacksonville, FL
09112 MALS 12
60462 NAS Adak, AK
6 0259 NAS Miramar, CA
68212 NAF Misawa, JA
65886 NADEP NAS Jacksonville, FL
65923 Marine Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, NC
09136 MALS 36
00421 Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, MD
65888 NADEP NAS North Island, CA
09111 MALS 11 (Rear) , 3rd MAW, MCAS El Toro, CA
48759 Naval Air Repair Activity Det
.
, Kimhae, SK
60 087 NAS Brunswick, ME
68753 Naval Air Pacific Repair Activity Det.,
Singapore
03366 USS AMERICA (CV-66)
00207 NAS Jacksonville, FL
033 69 USS DWIGHT D EISENHOWER (CVN-69)
eliminate existing work stoppage. (OPNAVINST 4614. IF) Hence,
as an industrial activity, NADEP (FAD IV) may use IPG I under
these circumstances. NADEP further uses IPG I to restock Pre-
Expended Bin (PEB) items when necessary. PEB items are low
value, common use consumable materials that are stocked in
bulk and issued as needed without documentation. They are
restocked when predetermined low limits, based on demand
19
history and lead time, are reached. At present, NADEP does
not have either a two-bin, kanban, or other system, to
easily determine when low limits have been reached.
As described by Mr J . Wilcoxen, NADEP Alameda's Material
Manager, a significant portion of NADEP' s IPG I requisitions
are generated as a result of Naval Air Systems Command
(NAVAIR) DLR Turn-Around Time (TAT) standards. For some
critical DLRs , TAT allowances can be as short as fifteen days
from initial diagnostic inspection until reissue as an
operational asset. Since part requirements are virtually
unknown until initial inspections are complete, IPG I is
often necessary to insure these parts are received in
sufficient time to allow completion of repairs by the
deadline
.
Finally, NADEP management takes a liberal view of the
UMMIPS definition of work stoppage. If planning or progress
review reveals that a delay may occur in completion of a job
due to lack of materials, NADEP will requisition using IPG I
to prevent this possible delay.
Other aviation maintenance units contributing to the high
proportion of Oakland's IPG I customer base include Naval Air
Stations (NAS) (FAD III) and Marine Aviation Logistics
Squadrons (MALS) (FAD III). Both activity types perform
essentially the same aircraft maintenance mission as NADEP,
but at intermediate levels . Intermediate maintenance is less
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complex than depot levels. Their IPG I requirements are also
generated to eliminate work stoppage.
In addition, materials are habitually required to meet
urgent operational commitments of shore-based patrol
squadrons. In particular, NAS Moffett Field generates
copious IPG I requisitions to support P-3 Orion squadrons.
These IPG I requirements are expected to continue and may
actually increase temporarily as Moffett Field draws down its
storeroom stocks in light of the closure of the Navy's
facilities at Moffett Field and the anticipated transfer of
the facilities to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), a current tenant of the base.
Oakland's major IPG I requisitioning constituencies also
include other types of industrial activities. In particular,
Mare Island Naval Shipyard is Oakland's second highest IPG I
requisitioning customer. These requisitions are placed
primarily in support of depot level overhauls of nuclear
submarines
.
In addition to Mare Island, other Naval Shipyards (NSY)
such as Bremerton, Long Beach, and Pearl Harbor; Ship Repair
Facilities (SRF) such as Yokosuka, Subic Bay, and Guam; and
Ship's Intermediate Maintenance Facilities (SIMA) such as San
Francisco, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor, contribute
significantly to Oakland's IPG I demand base. These
activities perform depot (NSYs) and intermediate (SRFs and
SIMAs) level maintenance on all types of ships and submarines.
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As with aviation industrial activities, these units are
allowed to use IPG I to eliminate work stoppage. Finally,
SRF Guam and other forward positioned activities often perform
emergent voyage repairs on deployed ships. IPG I
requisitioning is often required to complete these repairs in
a timely manner in order to allow the ship to meet operational
commitments
.
The Bay Area is the homeport for eighteen ships including
two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, three nuclear
cruisers, two reserve frigates and various logistics support
ships. These operational units constitute the final major
sources of IPG I requisitions. Because they are required to
maintain full mission capability at all times, they may
requisition using IPG I to restore mission debilitating
equipment casualties or to meet operational commitments.
These ships are also authorized to use higher requisitioning
priorities within IPG I because they are FAD I and II
activities. Finally, combatant ships are FAD I and are
allowed to use IPG I priorities to meet operational
commitments
.
2 . San Diego
a. History-
Naval Supply Depot (NSD) San Diego was established in 1922
to serve the needs of the growing number of Pacific Fleet
ships stationed in Southern California. At that time the
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first official permanent Navy logistics establishment in San
Diego, the La Playa Coaling Station at Point Loma, was also
merged with the NSD . NSD received its first materials in
February 1923 .
In 1941, the first Navy pier was built. Prior to
construction of this pier, replenishment of ships could only
be accomplished by boat. As the fleet grew to meet the
demands of World War II, NSD also expanded. As part of this
increase, a south wing was added to the original six-story
supply depot, and a seven-story warehouse was constructed
next door in 1943 .
NSD continued to expand after World War II as eight
warehouses were constructed at the Naval Station Annex to
support expanding material storage needs. By the end of the
fifties, NSD's customer base had grown significantly. As a
result, in 1959 it was recommissioned as the Navy Supply
Center (NSC), San Diego.
In 1973, NSC San Diego assumed logistics support for Long
Beach Naval Station, ships homeported in Long Beach, and Long
Beach Naval Shipyard. NSD Long Beach was then closed as part
of a Navy initiative to streamline shore establishments. In
1980, as a consequence of another consolidation effort, NSC
San Diego assumed responsibility for aviation material and
absorbed functions previously performed by the NAS North
Island Supply Department.
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Recently, NSC San Diego turned over its physical
distribution operations to DLA and its payroll operations to
the Defense Finance and Accounting Center (DFAC) . These
changes occurred as a result of DoD's DMRD to streamline
operations
.
In addition, NSC maintains a fuel department which stores
more than a million barrels of aviation and shipboard fuels.
Each year there is an annual throughput of more than twelve
million barrels. NSC ' s contracting departments also buy more
than 75 million dollars worth of spare parts and services per
year, primarily from local vendors.
Finally, as a result of the recent DMRDs, NSC San Diego
has become the west coast pilot location for the Fleet
Industrial Supply Center (FISC) concept. Today, as FISC San
Diego, the center operates in Southern California from Long
Beach in the north to Point Loma in the south and employs more
than 750 civilians and 31 military personnel.
b. Customer Base
As with DDOC, naval aviation maintenance units dominate
DDDC ' s demand base. The complete customer base in shown in
Appendix B. They are responsible for over fifty-nine percent
of all IPG I requisitions received by DDDC. In addition,
thirty-eight of the top seventy-five IPG I ordering UICs
during the period studied are aviation units. These UICs are
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listed in descending number of requisitions submitted in Table
III
.
Table III. Aviation Units among Top Seventy-Five San Diego




































NADEP North Island, San Diego, CA
NSY Long Beach, CA
NAS Miramar, CA
NAS North Island, San Diego, CA
PMTC Point Mugu, CA
NAS Lemoore, CA





NAS Cecil Field, Jacksonville, FL
NADEP, NAS Jacksonville, FL
MALS 12
MALS 11
Marine Aviation Depot, Cherry Pt, NC
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72)
USS FORRESTAL (CV-5 9)
MALS 16 (Rear), 3rd MAW, MCAS Tustin,
NAS Cubic, Point, RP
ASO Philadelphia, PA
MALS 3 9 Camp Pendleton, CA
NADEP NAS Pensacola, FL
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69)
USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63)
NAS Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA
USS SARATOGA (CV-60)




MALS 31 Beaufort, SC
CA
NADEP North Island is DDDC ' s most prolific IPG I
requisitioner . Its primary mission is to perform depot level
maintenance on aircraft airframes, avionics, engines, and
other systems. As with DDOC, a significant portion of
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NADEP's workload is to recondition DLRs . Further aviation
maintenance units contributing to the high proportion of San
Diego's IPG I customer base include NASs and MALSs
.
Just as Mare Island NSY is to Oakland, Long Beach NSY is
to San Diego in generating the second highest number of IPG I
requisitions. Long Beach NSY is the Navy's only West Coast
non-nuclear qualified shipyard. Its primary mission is to
overhaul surface combatants.
Long Beach NSY is, however, only one of several non-
aviation industrial activities that are major San Diego IPG I
requisitioning constituencies. These constituencies include
other NSYs such as Mare Island, Bremerton, and Pearl Harbor;
SRFs, and SIMAs . Again, these units use IPG I to prevent
work stoppage. Finally, as in Oakland, forward positioned
activities often perform emergent voyage repairs on deployed
ships. IPG I requisitioning is often required to complete
these repairs in a timely manner to allow the ship to meet
operational commitments.
Southern California is the homeport to over one hundred
and thirty ships of all types including three aircraft
carriers, twelve cruisers, fifteen nuclear-powered
submarines, and various logistics support ships. Unlike
Oakland, which has a relatively small number of afloat units,
San Diego has the largest concentration of Naval ships in the
Pacific Fleet. These operational units constitute the
largest, but not the most prolific, IPG I constituency
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discussed. The commands to which these ships are assigned
must maintain full mission capability at all times.
Therefore, as in the case with the ships homeported in the
Oakland area, they may requisition using IPG I to restore
mission debilitating equipment casualties and to meet
operational commitments. These ships are also authorized to




In 1942, the Sharpe site was officially dedicated as the
Lathrop Holding and Reconsignment Point. What was once a
central California sheep ranch was transformed into a major
military supply installation capable of loading 6,000 rail
cars per month with supplies and equipment at its wartime
peak. Often up to 450 rail cars were loaded or unloaded
within 24 hours.
Following World War II, the depot underwent administrative
changes as supply missions changed and assumed a new name in
1948. The depot was named Sharpe General Depot in honor of
Maj
. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe, Quartermaster General of the Army
from 1905 to 1918.
The lull after World War II was terminated by the Korean
War. Sharpe 's level of activity rebounded to its earlier high
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as manpower, shipments, and missions doubled during this
three-year effort.
Supply operations were gradually curtailed when the Korean
War ended and, by 1959, significant changes affecting
Sharpe's future role were taking place. DoD instituted the
"Single Manager Concept." This put the depot into the
business of providing medical supplies and subsistence on a
large scale for its sister services.
The Sharpe site became Sharpe Army Depot in 1962 when the
depot was assigned to the Army Supply and Maintenance Command.
In 1965, the nation again called upon Sharpe to support the
Vietnam War. Hundreds of Army aircraft, both fixed-wing and
helicopters, were arriving at Sharpe to get ready for
shipment overseas. Twenty- four hour operations began and
Sharpe became the major pipeline for supplies moving westward
to Southeast Asia.
Sharpe eventually became the Army's supermarket as items
such as amphibious watercraft, helicopters, generators,
jeeps, trucks, bridgebuilding equipment, nuts, bolts,
screws, and insect repellent were among the hundreds of
thousands of items in the Sharpe inventory.
In 1985, construction began on an ultra-modern warehouse
facility at Sharpe as part of the Army's Area of Operational
Responsibility (AOR) regional supply depot program. This
facility's features include high-rise storage racks with man-
riders similar to, but on a greater scale, than the system in
28
Oakland. Additional features include receiving assist devices
including bar code readers and on-line terminals at
receiving/inspection stations, storage and shipping stations
with bar code readers, and an automated guided vehicle
system. The facility was completed in 1991, with computer
links to DDRW headquarters in Tracy achieved during October of
1992.
Jb. Customer Base
The top one hundred Sharpe IPG I requisitioning activities
reflect a wider variety of services than either Oakland or San
Diego (Appendix C) . Over ninety- five percent of the two
latter activities top IPG I customers were either Navy or
Marine Corps. Understandably, however, seventy-five percent
of Sharpe 's TPG I requisitions were submitted by Army
activities. The remaining twenty-five percent reflect
requisitions submitted by the other three services; the
majority being from the Marine Corps and Air Force (Table IV)
.
In fact, Sharpe 's most prolific IPG I customer is the Marine
Corps Logistics Center at Barstow, California.
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Table IV. Sharpe Customer Base By Service.
Sharpe Customer Base by Service
Service # of Activities #IPG I Reqns % of Total
Army 75 22, 926 72 .7
Marines 8 4,370 13 .8
Air Force 16 4, 066 12.9
Navy 1 189 0.6
Totals 100 31,551 100.0
A major point of interest in examining Sharpe 's customer
base is the existence of an ad hoc two-tiered support system
within Army activities. It is possible, in extreme
circumstances, for an isolated operational unit to submit
requisitions, including IPG Is, directly to its designated
regional depot. The more common procedure is for the
requisitions to be accepted by either a direct or general
support unit which will, in turn, process them to the higher
level (depot) . In cases where no support units are co-located
with the requisitioner in question, requisitions are
submitted to the installation activity (either logistics or
industrial operations) who, in turn, transmits it to the next
higher level. It is important to note that these installation
activities have no endemic support relationship to operational
units and perform these services solely upon special




There are many reasons, both favorable and unfavorable,
for a customer to requisition using IPG I. This chapter will
discuss why customers use IPG I and suggest three alternatives
that DLA could consider to curb IPG I abuse. The advantages
and disadvantages of these alternatives are also discussed.
A. CUSTOMER REASONS FOR REQUISITIONING USING IPG I
As discussed in the last chapter, IPG I is designed to
expedite urgent material requirements. For operational units,
urgency corresponds to repair of critical equipment, the loss
of which seriously impairs the unit's ability to carry out its
mission. Therefore, operational unit urgent requirements are
well defined and IPG I abuse is relatively easy to uncover.
In addition, these units are subject to Supply Management
Assessments (SMA) by their immediate superior once every
eighteen months and violations of UMMIPS standards are
considered major inspection discrepancies (NAVSUP P-485)
.
For industrial units, urgency equates to work stoppages
which potentially can create significant additional costs in
lost labor hours and slipped production schedules. UMMIPS
standards are very specific for industrial activities. They
authorize use of IPG I only to eliminate existing work
stoppages. In practice, to some industrial activities'
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material managers, this policy is equivalent to "closing the
barn door after the horse has run out" (Wilcoxen '92) . As a
result, some industrial activities may use IPG I proactively,
in violation of UMMIPS guidelines, to requisition materials
necessary to prevent predicted work stoppages.
This proactive practice not only contributes to priority
abuse, but industrial material managers often rationalize
their definition of impending work stoppage to the point where
IPG I responsiveness becomes the expected norm. This may lead
to lower priorities becoming unacceptable for even routine
requirements as industrial activities attempt to minimize
ordering lead times.
Repair turn-around time reductions have been
institutionalized at industrial activities in response to
policies imposed upon them by their superiors. For example,
Naval Air Systems Command's (NAVAIR) "open and inspect" policy
for NADEP repair of Depot Level Repairables (DLR) states that
the time standard a NADEP is required to meet in returning
components to operational condition is applied to the time
interval in the NADEP which begins when the component is first
opened and inspected to determine repair requirements
(Wilcoxen '92). This policy forces limits on both material
ordering lead times and tolerance for variation in lead times




In addition, the costs of carrying inventories contribute
to industrial activities' overhead expenses. In the past,
these carrying costs were accepted as being the less expensive
alternative when compared with not having critical materials
available when needed. In other words, carrying inventories
was a preventive strategy used by these activities to avoid
stockouts and the associated work stoppages. This strategy is
now prohibitively expensive as shipyards and aviation depots
come under increasing pressure to reduce overhead costs and
follow the Defense Base Operating Fund (DBOF) guidelines that
encourage competition with private commercial activities.
As a consequence, both government and commercial repair
activities are now turning to Just-In-Time (JIT) management
techniques to reduce turn-around times and inventory carrying
costs. For government activities, these techniques also
encourage increased use of IPG I requisitioning. As long as
shipyards and aviation depots are not penalized by paying
increased prices for use of IPG I, cost minimization,
competitive pressures, and JIT dictate IPG I requisitioning.
Finally, the lack of rigorous audits by their superiors of
industrial activities' UMMIPS performance contributes to this
perception of IPG I's purpose. For example, based on one
author's experience, non-nuclear shipyard material operations
are subject to a cursory tri-annual NAVSEA audit. This audit
is normally completed in one week or less and findings are not
subject to the same scrutiny as in operational units.
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B. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO CURB IPG I ABUSE
UMMIPS policy already places restrictions on the use of
IPG I through the FAD and priority systems. These constraints
are compounded by upper limit restrictions on amounts of IPG
I and II requisitions each activity type may submit (OPNAVINST
4614. IF) . For example, no more than, eighty percent of all
requisitions submitted by a submarine may be IPG I or II.
Aviation depots and shipyards are similarly limited to an IPG
I and II ceiling of no more than fifty percent of all
requisitions submitted. DLA already has the capability to
generate reports by UIC that list, by IPG, total amounts of
requisitions submitted (Green '92). DLA could aggressively
enforce the UMMIPS ceilings, or set their own IPG I limits.
To deal with activities exceeding these ceilings DLA could:
(1) refuse to process these additional IPG I requisitions; (2)
automatically downgrade any additional requisitions to IPG II
or III; and (3) impose penalty costs in the form of
surcharges on all IPG Is.
The first alternative of simply refusing to process IPG I
requisitions over a set limit is not reasonable. DLA's
primary mission is to support their customers. Flat refusal
to process these requisitions is inconsistent with this
mission. Therefore, automatic downgrading of or applying
penalty costs to IPG I requisitions is much more practical.
Current DLA practice is to reduce to IPG III any IPG I
requisition that does not cite certain Required Delivery Dates
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(RDD) and project codes (Corbett '92). The advantage of this
type of policy is that customer requisitions would continue to
remain valid in the supply system but their lead times would
increase in accordance with the lower priority standards.
This automatic downgrade policy was established to insure
illicit IPG I requisitions were filtered out and not
expedited. DLA could broaden this concept to expand the
number and types of IPG I requisitions subject to automatic
downgrading
.
By adapting this restrictive policy, DLA could also
predict their IPG I workload and plan accordingly. DLA could
even determine their desired workload requirements first, and
then set their ceilings to insure this desired workload is not
exceeded. Unfortunately, this policy is relatively
insensitive to real world shifts in customer needs and,
therefore, should be carefully monitored by DLA.
The final alternative suggested would be to impose a
penalty cost, in the form of a surcharge, on all IPG I
requisitions. One advantage of using surcharges as a method
to control IPG I abuse is they can be tailored precisely to
the customer. As described above, use of IPG I by
operational units is tightly restricted by policy. These
restrictions are then enforced through rigorous inspection and
reporting procedures. Therefore, these units' IPG I
requisitions are likely to be legitimate and they should not,
under any circumstance, be required to pay IPG I surcharges.
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Other units, including industrial activities, not subject to
rigid oversight could be levied a surcharge by DLA for their
use of IPG I.
Surcharges also have the advantage of leaving the ultimate
decision up to the customer as they would be required to
evaluate if IPG I responsiveness is worth the additional cost
(surcharge) they must pay. In other words, market forces
would determine the value of responsiveness to each customer
if they must pay a premium price for that responsiveness.
Upon intuitive evaluation of the above alternatives, CDR
Corbett felt that the concept of surcharge imposition may be
the preferable method for curbing customer abuse of and
reducing DLA's costs associated with IPG I requisitions
(Corbett '91) . This reasoning, reinforced by cursory evidence
available at the time, lead to his request for further
research on the potential for development of a surcharge





1 . Previous Models
a. Material Logistics (MN3372) Course Project
The first feasibility test of this thesis topic was as a
research paper for The Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS)
Material Logistics course (MN3372) (Halkias & Miller '92).
Halkias and Miller developed a model for emulating the
Shipboard Uniform Automated Data Processing System (SUADPS)
Demand Based Item (DBI) procedures for consumables at
mechanized consumer or intermediate level activities (NAVSUP
P-553) .
The first part of the model consisted of the inequalities
used to decide when to stock or retain an item in stock. The
rules are that an item will be stocked if annual demand is
greater than two units per year. Items will be retained in
stock if there was at least one unit of yearly demand.
Once an item meets these stockage thresholds, the SUADPS-
DBI mechanism establishes a reorder point and requisitioning
objective. The reorder point is created by adding a
predetermined safety level to the number of units required to
meet the average demand during an order and shipping time
specified by OPNAVINST 4614. IF. The requisitioning objective
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is determined by adding an operating level to this reorder
point. The operating level, or order quantity, is based on
the average monthly demand, item unit price, ordering costs,
and inventory holding costs (Equations 1 and 2)
.
ROP=(SLF*AMD) +{OSTF*AMD) (D
R0=R0P+\J2^A/H \/AMD/ UP (2)
where
ROP = Reorder Point (Low Limit);
RO = Requisition Objective (High Limit);
SLF = Safety Level Factor;
AMD = Average Monthly Demand;
OSTF = Order & Ship Time Factor;
A = Ordering Cost;
H = Holding Cost Rate; and
UP = Unit Price
To test surcharge effects on this model, a flat rate
surcharge variable was added to the ordering cost and/or the
unit price was increased by the percentage surcharge. The
Safety Level Factor (SLF) was also adjusted separately from
six months to three months to ascertain its effects on the
model when altering surcharges. A fictional data base was
developed in the MN3372 project to perform a sensitivity
analysis of these two types of surcharges alone and in
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combination. The model and fictional sample data base were
written into a "Lotus 1-2-3" spreadsheet application.
Sensitivity analyses were conducted by altering unit
prices using a range of percentage surcharges to assess the
effects of those surcharges on ordering decisions. Flat rate
surcharges also were tested by progressively increasing the
administrative order cost portion of the model. Both types of
surcharges were set at a variety of levels both individually
and in combination. Total dollar values and number of items
stocked in inventory were recorded at each level. Customer
response was displayed by plotting the changes in inventory
levels and dollar values as percentage and flat rate IPG I
surcharges were imposed.
Graphs of the results of these analyses were examined for
trends (Figures 1 through 6) . These trends are a result of
the changes mentioned above. This simple model revealed
fundamental phenomenons that have continued to hold true as
both models and databases evolved in their complexity. First,
even a modest percentage of unit price as a surcharge can
rapidly affect both the level (number of items carried) and
total value, which includes the surcharge, of inventory
carried (see Figures 1 and 4) . Review of the fictional data
base revealed this was especially true for more expensive
items
.
Next, requisition flat rate surcharges exerted a strong
influence on the inventory depth of customer-stocked items as
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a consequence of the customer attempting to reduce the number
of requisitions submitted. Inspite of that, the value of the
inventory does not increase very much (see Figures 2 and 5)
.
Review of the fictional data base disclosed flat rate
surcharges tend to be more effective for lower priced items
with few demands because the flat rate drives up total
requisition cost independent of unit price. In combination,
flat rates were quickly overshadowed by even modest percentage
surcharges. Finally, when the Safety Level Factor (SLF) was
reduced to three months levels, the number of items stocked
and the dollar values of inventory carried dropped
significantly (compare Figures 1, 2, and 3 with Figures 4,
5 , and 6)
.
Unfortunately, the SUADPS-DBI decision process was not
suitable for this thesis. In that process stock range
decisions are based on the yearly quantity demanded exceeding
two and then one to retain. Unit costs are not considered in
making this part of the decision. Therefore, surcharges
would not be a factor in deciding stock.
An additional shortcoming of the SUADPS-DBI decision
process was its inability to deal with the effects of
surcharges on items not brought into stock due to an annual
demand of less than two units. Surcharges could conceivably
justify stocking a small quantity of these items as the least
cost alternative. This could occur if surcharge policies were









































Figure 1. Percent Surcharge Only;
Ship Time = 6 months



































Figure 2. Flat Rate Surcharge Only; Safety Level and Order &
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Figure 3. Percent/Flat Rate Surcharge Combinations; Safety


































Figure 4. Percent Surcharge Only;
Order & Ship Time = 6 months






































Figure 5. Flat Rate Surcharge Only;
Order & Ship Time = 6 months



























Figure 6. Percent/Flat Rate Surcharge Combinations;
Level = 3 months, Order & Ship Time = 6 months
Safety
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frequency orders of one or less unit per year.
The final shortcoming is the lack of cost elements in the
reorder point calculation. Surcharges would increase the cost
of issuing IPG I requisitions to fill stockout demands.
Therefore, to avoid paying these higher costs, the safety
level portion of the reorder point equation would be expected
to increase as IPG I surcharges were imposed. The SUADPS-DBI
process contains a predetermined "Safety Level Factor"
determined by Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , or Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) ; it does not include a direct method
to ascertain the effects of surcharges on safety stocks
.
b. Logistics Engineering (MN4310) Course Project
The MN3372 project theme was further refined by follow-on
research conducted for NPS ' s Logistics Engineering course
(MN4310) (Ebert, Halkias, Miller, Parker '92). DDOC
provided the Unit Identification Codes (UICs) and the total
numbers of IPG I requisitions submitted by their top fifty
customers over a nine-month period from June 1991 through
March 1992
.
Analysis of this data revealed that a high proportion of
customers were industrial activities. In particular, Naval
Aviation Depot (NADEP) Alameda submitted roughly forty percent
of DDOC's IPG I requisitions. NADEP Alameda's primary mission
is to perform depot level aircraft maintenance. Naval Air
Stations (NAS) accounted for an additional twenty-nine percent
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of all demands. These air stations submitted their
requirements to support intermediate level maintenance
actions. When Naval Shipyards and other ship repair
facilities were included, industrial activities accounted for
approximately eighty-five percent of DDOC ' s IPG I customer
requisitions
.
Industrial activities present unique difficulties for
inventory modelers. These activities order materials to
complete specific actions referred to as jobs. With the
exception of generic consumable materials, these activities
do not normally maintain inventories to sustain fleet
readiness
.
This research paper attempted to duplicate the decision
logic a material manager might exercise in deciding whether to
continue IPG I requisitioning as urgent needs arose or
maintain limited inventories. A "Lotus 1-2-3" spreadsheet
application was used to address the tradeoff between ordering
as requirements occurred with an IPG I surcharge and
maintaining an inventory and ordering without a surcharge
based on EOQ reorder point calculations. As DDOC provided
only UICs and their total numbers of IPG I requisitions, an
accompanying "fictional" individual requisition data base was
created to facilitate the tradeoff analysis.
The annual costs to order with a surcharge were
calculated by multiplying the annual quantity of an item
demanded by the surcharge-adjusted unit price for that item.
48
This adjustment was accomplished by multiplying the unit price
by one plus the decimal fraction (associated with the percent)
for the percent surcharge, then adding the flat rate surcharge
to this total. The annual quantity demanded was then
multiplied by the original unit price and was subtracted from
the adjusted annual costs to provide only the total annual
costs associated with the surcharges.
Determining the costs to stock without a surcharge was
a more complex process. Prior to EOQ computations, the
fictitious data base was examined for multiple requisitions
for identical items. These multiple requisitions were
included in the fictitious data base to test EOQ reordering
frequencies vice IPG I requisitioning as individual demands
occurred (unless EOQ is equal to one unit, fewer requisitions
would be generated using an EOQ model than would be if a
requisition was submitted for each unit demanded) . Multiple
requisitions for identical items were totalled by quantity
ordered at the bottom of the spreadsheet in order to simulate
annual demand. This sum was used to calculate EOQ for the
item. The EOQ was also calculated for unique single
requisitions; in these cases, quantity ordered was assumed to
be annual demand.
These EOQs were then used in the average annual total
variable cost equation to determine the annual total variable
costs to order and carry in stock. Both total cost to stock
and total cost to order were based on the total cost equation
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used to derive the deterministic EOQ without backorders
(Tersine ' 88) .
Surcharges were not applied in determining stockage costs
as the assumption was made that inventory reorders would be
made using routine priorities as required by the calculated
reorder point
.
The model was also designed with a variable lead time
option to allow exclusion from high priority requisitions
those items which, under routine ordering priorities, would
possess acceptable lead times.
The decision to place an item in stock or order with IPG
I was made by comparing surcharge and total annual variable
costs. The minimum cost determined by this comparison was
added to a running total maintained for each category on the
spreadsheet
.
As in the MN3372 paper, flat rates and percentages
were incorporated into the order costs and unit prices,
respectively, when surcharges were applied. The program
facilitated sensitivity analyses for a wide variety of
percentages and flat rate surcharges, both independently and
in combinations.
Percentage surcharges alone were extremely effective for
higher valued items; these items rapidly shifted to being
stocked in inventory as the rates climbed (Figures 7, 8).
Combinations of flat rate and percentage surcharges were
addressed in Figure 9 . Figure 9 appears to be very similar to
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Figure 8, but actual costs are slightly higher with the
addition of a flat rate of eight dollars per requisition.
Figure 7 disclosed some interesting traits. To simulate
materials carried in Oakland's inventory, several items in
the fictional data base were created with a response time
under routine ordering priorities of five days. In other
words, using normal priorities the customer would have
material within five days of submitting a routine requisition.
Therefore, if the customer was willing to accept a lead time
of five days, these items would be neither ordered using IPG
I, nor stocked in customer inventories. Instead, these
items would continue to be ordered as needed using routine
priorities. In Figure 7 the customer is willing to wait five
days and, as a result, the total cost to order line does not
decrease to zero with the increased application of percent
surcharges. In Figure 8, the customer is only willing to
accept a lead time of four days and, therefore, all items
are subject to percent surcharges. Under these circumstances,
the total cost to order line decreases to zero as these
surcharges are increased and all items are eventually stocked.
As percent surcharges were applied the total cost to stock
rose as the number of items brought into inventory increased
in steady increments. Between six and nine percent cost to
order continued to rise while cost to stock remained level.
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Figure 7. Percent surcharge only, Lead Time = 5 days, Order
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Figure 8. Percent surcharge only, Lead Time = 4 days, Order
Cost = $20, Holding Cost Rate = 23%
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Legend
- Total Cost to Stock
- Total Cost to Order
Total Cost
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Percent Surcharge
Figure 9. Percent and Flat Rate Surcharge, Lead Time = 4
days, Order Cost = $20, Holding Cost Rate = 23%, Flat Rate
= $8
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this percentage range increased the cost to order, it did not
increase this cost enough to force additional items into
stock. As a result, the cost to stock did not increase. By
the time the percent surcharges had risen to twelve percent,
only very low valued items, and items meeting the response
time requirement of five days without using IPG I, continued
to be ordered.
In Figures 8 and 9, the lead time requirement was reduced
to four days. No items in the data base created met this four
day threshold and, as a result, all were subject to the
order using IPG I versus stock in inventory decision. As
shown in Figure 8, the cost to stock rose steeply between
three and six percent as most items were brought into
inventory. From six through twelve percent the cost to stock
rose gradually as the remaining items migrated into customer
stocks. Another noteworthy event between two and twelve
percents is the sharp peak in total costs as surcharges are
paid for items that continue to be ordered while cost to stock
rise as more items are brought into customer inventories.
After twelve percent all items, regardless of cost, were
stocked and none were ordered. As a result, the total cost
to order line decreased to zero and both the total cost and
cost to stock stabilized at approximately half a million
dollars
.
Although not shown, flat rate surcharges were initially
significant for low dollar value items even at relatively
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modest values. However, after this initial impact and the
migration of low unit price items into stock, even extremely
large flat rates surcharges (levels of up to five hundred
dollars per transaction were tested) appeared to be
ineffective
.
The MN4310 research provided the first quantitative
evidence of the intuitive hypothesis that a combination of
flat rate and percentage surcharges was the most effective
method of reducing total IPG I requisitions (Figure 9) . As in
the MN3372 paper, the effects of the percentage surcharge
quickly dominated flat rates.
B. THESIS MODEL DESCRIPTION
1. Model Requirements
To fulfill CDR Corbett's proposal requirements,
actual IPG I requisitioning data from several types of
activities and more sophisticated modelling techniques were
essential. Although the MN3372 and MN4310 projects were
useful for understanding surcharge effects, both models were
rather simplistic because of their small fictional data bases.
The model requirements for this thesis have evolved
considerably since the idea was originally conceived in
December of 1991. At that time, leading IPG I customers were
to be classified by type of activity. A model duplicating the
inventory management system used by each activity type was to
have been created to test surcharge effects using actual
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requisition histories as data bases. Analysis of Oakland's
customer base during the MN4310 paper revealed some problems
with this approach.
As described earlier, Oakland's most prolific IPG I
customers are industrial activities. Industrial activities
plan job-unique material orders using Material Requirements
Planning (MRP) , Just-In-Time (JIT) , or similar management
systems instead of an EOQ-based system. Considerable thought
was given to duplicating these procedures as the basis for
analyzing surcharges effects on these activities. Ultimately
this idea was rejected for the following reasons. First,
these systems were designed to minimize on-hand inventories
and reduce associated warehousing costs by ordering materials
to arrive just prior to use. MRP and JIT-type systems might
respond to surcharge-increased IPG I requisitioning costs by
reducing their stockout risk through establishing inventories
or by changing priority class. This latter alternative would
mean they would have to plan for longer lead times. Due to
their major customers' pressure for reducing repair turn-
around times, extending lead times might not be feasible for
many industrial activities.
Second, MRP and JIT systems do not manage items based
on total activity requirements such as annual demand. As
noted above, materials are ordered according to the
requirements of individual jobs. Therefore, a JIT- or MRP-
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based model to test the surcharge effects would show only cost
increases for the customer.
Finally, the extracts each depot provided of their
demand histories were keyed on document and stock numbers.
JIT-and MRP-based models would have to be based on job
requirements for materials. The depot data bases, however,
did not contain the information required to sort by individual
job because job order numbers (JONs) were not available from
the depots for the individual activities.
Stochastic models were considered because demand is
really a random variable. However, the accurate lead time
data was not available. Although it was possible to
determine the date a requirement was placed using the Julian
date contained in the requisition number, the date the
customer actually received the material could only be obtained
by a review of each customer's receipt records. That would
require substantially more time than was available for this
thesis effort.
An additional goal was to develop a generic model
useful to integrate both retail and wholesale activities. To
recreate various decision processes by retail activity type
would have resulted in a complex model. A less complex model
is expected to have greater appeal to a wider scope of users




When all factors were considered, the best modeling
alternative appeared to be a slightly more sophisticated
version of the decision making process developed for the
MN4310 paper. The thesis model would, therefore, be based
on the EOQ model (Tersine '88) and its deterministic Total
Variable Costs (TVC) when stockage occurs and the costs under
the surcharge policy when items are ordered one-for-one under
an IPG I priority. A simple model founded on the model
described above should adequately test proposed DLA surcharge
effects on retail customers. In successfully accomplishing
these tests, the model would fulfill this thesis' primary
goal. The simple model is sufficient because only one year's
worth of demand was known for both Oakland and San Diego. In
addition, the requisition history provided by Sharpe covered
less than eight months and had to be extrapolated (linearly)
to estimate annual demand.
2. Model Description
The EOQ equation requires data for four parameters
(equation 3) . Annual demand is the total quantity of an item
demanded by an activity. Order cost is the cost to the
ordering activity of submitting a requisition to the supply
system. This order cost includes salaries and requisition
processing costs incurred by the ordering office. Unit price
of the item is the price charged to the customer by the supply
system for the item. Unit price does not include proposed IPG
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I surcharges but does include all other charges levied by DLA
that are included in the unit price, regardless of
requisitioning priority. Annual holding costs are calculated
as a decimal fraction of the item's price (the Navy uses 0.23
for a consumable item and 0.21 for a repairable item) .
Holding costs include warehousing expenditures, obsolescence,
pilferage, and other losses associated with maintaining a
stock of an item in an activity's warehouse. The EOQ model's
average annual Total Variable Costs (TVC S ) formula is given





TVCS=\/2RCPF ; < 4 >
where
EOQ = Economic Order Quantity in Units;
TVC S = Total Variable Cost to Stock;
R = Annual Demand in Units;
C = Ordering Cost per Order;
P = Unit Price of the Item; and
F = Annual Holding Cost as a Decimal Fraction of P.
When an item is not stocked but is ordered instead as
needed under IPG I, the average annual total variable costs






f ) ; (5)
TVC = Total Variable Cost to Continue IPG I ordering;
R = Annual Demand in Units;
S
p = Percentage IPG I Surcharge (given as a decimal
fraction) per Unit;
P = Unit Price;
N = Number of IPG I Requisitions submitted;
C = Ordering Cost per requisition; and
S £ - Flat Rate Surcharge per IPG I order.
3 . Model Parameters Values
The data provided by each depot was segregated by Unit
Identification Code (UIC) , and within each UIC by National
Stock Number (NSN) . The individual requisition quantities for
identical NSNs were then totalled to provide actual IPG I
annual demand quantities for each item. An additional
calculation determined the number of times the same NSN
appeared in different requisitions. This total was used to
determine the total number of requisitions, N, submitted
annually by the UIC for the item. The data also included unit
prices, P, for most items.
Through Cognizance Symbols (Cogs) and Federal Supply
Groups (FSG) , a means was provided to determine applicable
service peculiar holding cost rates for each item, F. As
mentioned earlier, there are two Navy holding cost rates,
0.21 for repairables, and 0.23 for consumable items
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(repairables are less likely to be pilfered or lost than
consumable items) (GAO/NSIAD Report #92-112). The repairable
holding cost rate was assigned to Cogs described in Table V.
The 0.23 rate was used for all other Cogs.
Table V. Repairable Item Cogs.
Cog Description
2F Major Shipboard Electronic Equipment
3H Ships Parts Control Center managed Fleet Level
Repairables (FLR)
4Z Airborne Armament Equipment
6K End Items of Photographic Equipment
7E Depot Level Repairable Ordnance Equipment Repair
Parts and Air Missile Parts
7G Depot Level Repairable Electronic Equipment
7H Depot Level Repairable Shipboard and Base
Equipment, Assemblies, Components and Repair
Parts
7R Depot Level Repairable Aviation Material
7Z General Purpose Electronic Test Equipment
8A Inert Nuclear Weapons Material
Sharpe's data was not associated with Cogs. Fortunately,
the first two digits of an item's NSN are its Federal Supply
Group (FSG) . FSG categories can be associated with Army
holding cost rates. For example, aircraft components and
accessories are FSG 16 and were assigned the holding cost rate
of 0.14 for the Army Aviation Systems Command. These rates and
categories are shown in Tables VI and VII.
Order costs could be set at any desired level but, for
this thesis, were fixed at twenty dollars for each UIC
.
Based on the authors' personal experience, twenty dollars was
chosen as the value for C in the TVC formulas to reflect the
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Table VI. Sharpe Inventory Control Points, Holding Cost
Rates (F), and Associated FSGs
.










Average of all HCRs 0.17 other FSGs






















Aircraft & Airframe Structural Components
Aircraft Components & Accessories
Vehicular Equipment Components
Tires & Tubes
Engines, Turbines and Components
Engine Accessories
Mechanical Power Transmission Equipment
Bearings
Pipe, Tubing, Hose, & Fittings
Valves
Hardware & Abrasives
Communication, Detection, & Coherent
Radiation Equipment
Electrical & Electronic Equipment Components
Electric Wire & Power Distribution Equipment
relatively low administrative expenses for retail activities
to submit IPG I requisitions to the Navy and DLA supply
systems. Unlike wholesale activities, retail units very
rarely issue contracts to attain these materials. Instead,
they submit their requisitions to the supply system
electronically via the Defense Automated Address System
(DAAS) . As a result, retail order costs are much lower than
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wholesale order costs which can range from $116 to $3880
depending on the size of the purchase and the inventory
control point (GAO/NSIAD Report #92-112).
Finally, percentage, S
p ,
and flat rate, S f/ surcharges are
added. Obviously, these charges can be set at any desired
values . Both changes can be set to zero to represent the case
of having no IPG I surcharges, or individually set to zero
while allowing the other to vary to test the effects of a
particular surcharge type. For example, to test an IPG I
surcharge of five percent with no flat rate, the flat rate
would be set to zero.
These IPG I surcharges were used only in calculating the
average annual Total Variable Cost to Order (TVC ) using IPG
I when no inventories are maintained.
The TVC (equation 5) was calculated by multiplying
the unit price of an item by the decimal fraction associated
with the percentage surcharge levied to obtain a surcharge
amount per unit, S
p
. This surcharge per unit total was next
multiplied by the annual demand for the NSN. The flat rate
surcharge, S f , was then multiplied by the number of times the
item was requisitioned per year. The annual percentage and
flat rate surcharge costs were then added to provide the total





TVC S and TVC values for each activity's NSN were
compared to determine the most cost-effective choice. If TVC^
was less than TVC , maintaining stocks of the item was chosen
as the optimal alternative and TVC 3 was added to the
activity's cost to stock total for other NSNs . If, however,
TVC was less than TVC S , continuing to order the item as
required using IPG I without maintaining stocks was selected
as the optimal choice and TVC is added to the cost to order
total for other NSNs. When the two TVCs were equal, TVC was
chosen as being the least cost alternative for the retail
activity. This decision was made based on the perceived
desire of most retail activities that they want to minimize




A. DESCRIPTION OF ELEMENTS
This chapter describes methods used to examine each supply
depot's data base. First, A-B-C charts comparing each
depot's top IPG I order generating UICs to the cumulative
total number of requisitions submitted are discussed. Second,
wire diagrams (three-dimension graphs) delineating the effects
of IPG I surcharges are considered. These wire diagrams were
created using iterations of the thesis model described in the
previous chapter. Both A-B-C charts and wire diagrams are
also analyzed with an emphasis on similarities and differences
between Oakland, San Diego, and Sharpe.
Wire diagrams and interval tables detailing the number of
requisitions submitted per NSN were also prepared for NADEPs
Alameda and North Island, and the NSYs at Mare Island and
Long Beach. These activities are the top two customers for
Oakland (Alameda and Mare Island) and San Diego (North Island
and Long Beach) and provide the opportunity to examine the
effects of IPG I surcharges on similar types of customers for
these two DLA depots. Finally, interesting points discovered





All data processing was performed on MPS ' s Amdahl Model
5995 mainframe computer system using SAS software. Prior to
its use in analyses, each tape was audited and SAS programs
were used to write data sets which were stored in the
mainframe to minimize analysis run times. In the process,
requisition records which were either duplicated, incomplete,
or outside the year, between June 1991 and May 19"92, were
ignored. As requested to minimize processing time, both
Oakland and San Diego provided separate tapes with IPG I
requisition histories only. Sharpe was unable to sort their
MRO history tapes by IPG so their tapes included all
requisitioning priorities . These tapes were sorted on the NPS
mainframe and an IPG I-only database was created.
A cursory initial review was performed on each valid data
base as it was created. For Oakland and San Diego this
evaluation was conducted using Cogs. Because Sharpe 's data
base did not contain Cogs, the FSG was used as a substitute.
Cogs and FSGs appearing most frequently were matched with
applicable holding cost rates for use in the surcharge model.
Each supply depot's data was also sorted to identify
which UICs were submitting the most IPG I requisitions. Top
IPG I requisitioners were then determined using Pareto's 20-80
Rule of the significant few and trivial many. This analysis
revealed that the top seventy-five (Oakland and San Diego) or
one hundred (Sharpe) customers constituted approximately sixty
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percent of all three depots' IPG I requisitions received.
Beyond these top UICs, the percentage of IPG I requisitions
received from each activity decreased dramatically. Top UICs
for each supply depot were matched with their official titles,
listed in descending order of requisitioning frequency, and
are included in Appendices A, B, and C.
These UIC lists also contained all information required to
create A-B-C curves to compare each supply depot. Figures 11,
12, and 13 show these curves. San Diego's curve has the
steepest initial slope of the three (Figure 11), Oakland's
was second (Figure 12), and Sharpe's was third (Figure 13)
.
This is a consequence of San Diego having the heaviest
concentration of local aviation and industrial units of the
three (see the top 10 in Tables VIII, IX, and X)
.
Although Oakland's final IPG I data base was the largest
of the three with over 43,000 requisitions distributed among
the top seventy five UICs, review of Oakland's UICs indicates
it was less steep than San Diego because of the fairly uniform
distribution of aviation and industrial units throughout the
requisition frequency rankings.
Sharpe's data base was the smallest of the three supply
activities studied. Because the number of requisitions
submitted (from most to least prolific IPG I customer) tended
to be more uniform and small, inclusion of one hundred UICs
was required in order to achieve a data base with at least
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Figure 12. ABC Chart of Sharpe's Top 100 Activities (Total
Requisitions were 31,551).
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Table VIII. Top & Bottom 10 Activities of the San Diego Top
75 Activities.
Top Ten Units
1) NADEP North Island
2) Long Beach NSY
3) NAS Miramar
4) NAS North Island
5) PMTC Point Mugu
6) NAS Lemoore
7) MALS 24
8) USS AMERICA (CV-66)
9) NAS Norfolk
10) USS INDEPENDENCE (CV
Bottom Ten Units
66) USS NIMITZ(CVN-68)
67) Subase, Pearl Harbor
68) USS PRINCETON (CG-5 9)
69) MCAF Quant i co
70) SRF Guam
71) USS ELLIOT (DD-967)





Note: Complete names may be found in Appendix c





2) Mare Island NSY
3) NAS Moffett Field
4) Pearl Harbor NSY
5) NAS Barbers Point
6) SRF Yokosuka
7) SIMA Pearl Harbor
8) NAPRAP Atsugi
9) NAS North Island
10) Puget Sound NSY
Bottom 10 Units
66) USS MIDWAY (CV- 41
67) USS NIMITZ(CVN-6
68) USS DIXON (AS-37
69) NAF Atsugi
70) USS SARATOGA (CV-
71) MALS 14
72) NAS Willow Grove
73) Army Troop Aviat
Systems Command
74) MALS 16 (Rear)




Note: Complete names may be found in Appendix B
during the nine-month period of the data.
Sharpe's customers are also very different from either
Oakland's or San Diego's. Although the number one IPG I
ordering activity is the Marine Corps Logistic Depot at
Barstow, the top customers are dominated by Army installation
property and maintenance activities, which more often than not
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are civilian run operations. These organizations are
responsible for property accountability and maintenance
support of Army activities; they are similar to Naval Station
public works departments and are not active combat units.
With the exception of some Air Force, a few more Marine, and
one Navy activity, this pattern remains consistent through
the rest of the units included in the Sharpe data base. It is
interesting to note, however, that the majority of operational
Army combat service support (CSS) units, both active and
reserve, are in the lower half of the list. Indeed, five of
the bottom ten listed in Table X are such units, in stark
contrast to the top ten units listed in which only one
appears
.
Based on the Army author's experience, a possible
explanation is that most Army CSS units (which order the bulk
of requisitions in support of combat forces) are normally
assigned lower Authorized Levels of Operation (ALO) than their
respective combat counterparts. This, in particular, is
almost always true for CONUS-based units. Since this
operational reality often means assignment of a lower priority
FAD (which is identified by a higher number; for example,
FAD IV has a lower priority than FAD I) and significantly
reduced ordering budgets, (especially for Class IX supplies,
namely, repair parts), many of these units tend to forecast
future customer demand and unit needs well ahead of time and
can then order supplies and repair parts using a low priority.
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CPA Toole AFB (Army)
USA Intel Ctr,
Ft Huachuca







GEN SPC SEC Maint
Div, Ft Carson
Bottom Ten Units
91) CMD, Ft McCoy
92) Combat Equip Grp SWA,
Doha
93) 177th SPT BN,
*
Ft Irwin
94) 782nd Maint BN,
*
Ft Bragg
95) 14th CBT Equip CO,*
Moenchengladbach
96) 1113th Trans CO,
*
Sacramento
97) FOMS NO 5
Pineville
98) Acft Maint Cont
Ft Rucker
99) 99th SPT BN,
*
Ft Lewis
100) Acft Maint Cont 3,
Ft Rucker
* = Combat Service Support Unit (CSS)
Note: Complete names may be found in Appendix D
This practice serves a twofold purpose. First, it replenishes
the CSS units' Authorized Stockage Lists (ASL) for servicing
their own customers. Second, it also satisfies their
internal unit needs by replenishing their Prescribed Load
Lists (PLL) in addition to accumulating an unauthorized but
functional "bench stock" . Ultimately, they can only use IPG
I upon written approval of the unit commander.
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C. IPG I SURCHARGE WIRE DIAGRAMS
1. Data Analysis
The depot model was configured to produce one four-column
table as an output file for each of the three supply depots
(Oakland, San Diego, and Sharpe) , NADEPs Alameda and North
Island, and Mare Island and Long Beach NSYs (Appendix D) .
The first column consisted of flat rate surcharges applied per
IPG I order in ten-dollar increments from zero to one hundred
dollars. The second column contained a percentage surcharge
applied to each IPG I item's unit price. These percentages
were increased from zero to ten percent in one percent
increments. The table considers all possible combinations of
these surcharges to produce a total of one hundred twenty-one
surcharge combinations. The third column consists of the
difference, or delta, between the Total Variable Cost to
Order (TVC ) , and the Total Variable Cost to Stock (TVCJ ;
that is, delta = (TVC - TVCJ . The fourth column contains
the difference (NSN - NSNS ) between the total number of NSNs
ordered using IPG I, (NSN ) , and the total number of NSNs
brought into customers' inventories, (NSNS ) , for each
combination of fixed and percentage surcharges.
For each depot, this table was used to produce two three-
dimensional "wire plot" graphs with flat rate and percentage
surcharge values on the y and x axes, respectively. The z
axis on the first graph is the difference between the number
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of NSNs ordered using IPG I and NSNs brought into customer
inventories. That graph views the plotted data from the
corner having the largest values for the x and y axis . The
origin is "hidden"
.
The graphs for all of the depots reveal that the NSN delta
is most positive or least negative at the origin when no IPG
I surcharges are applied. San Diego's peak NSN delta at the
origin is double that of Oakland (9316 to 4385) (Figures 13 and
14) . The wire plot for Sharpe is the only one that reveals a
negative NSN delta through its entire range, including the
peak (-4145) . In other words, at all surcharge levels, more
items migrate into stock than are ordered through the use of
IPG I at Sharpe (Figure 15) . This is because many Army
customers requisition supplies using lower priorities in order
to replenish their ASLs, accumulate local benchstocks, and
accommodate tighter operating budgets.
By comparison, the peak values of NSN deltas for the
NADEPs (Figures 16 and 17) are in the 200 - 300 range while
NSYs (Figures 18 and 19) exhibit peak values under 50. A
likely explanation for this difference is that there are more
aircraft and Depot Level Repairable (DLR) overhauls scheduled
at the NADEPs than ship overhauls scheduled at NSYs. This
larger number of aviation and DLR component overhauls produces
a great need for NADEPs to use IPG I to facilitate their rapid
turnaround requirements. In contrast, at the NSYs the
relatively low number of ships in overhaul at any given time
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OAKLAND IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT





Figure 13. Oakland Three-Dimensional NSN Graph
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SAN DIEGO SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT






Figure 14. San Diego Three-Dimensional NSN Graph
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SHARPE IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT









Figure 15. Sharpe Three-Dimensional NSN Graph
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NADEP ALAMEDA IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT








Figure 16. NADEP Alameda Three-Dimensional NSN Graph
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NADEP NORTH ISLAND IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT






Figure 17. NADEP North Island Three-Dimensional NSN Graph
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MARE ISLAND NSY SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT










Figure 18. Mare Island NSY Three-Dimensional NSN Graph
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LONG BEACH NSY IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT








Figure 19. Long Beach NSY Three-Dimensional NSN Graph
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allows more flexibility in forecasting material requirements.
From their origin, all of the three-dimensional graphs of
NSN deltas fall off steeply into negative NSN delta values as
surcharges are levied. In addition, the effect of a flat
rate surcharge alone is immediate and remains most pronounced
until it reaches forty dollars on the average. After forty
dollars, flat rate curves tend to begin to level off. This
trait can be explained by the relatively large amount of low-
value/high-demand items that are brought into an activity's
inventory when modest flat rates are charged. As flat rate
surcharges continue to climb, more costly and less demanded
items are drawn into stock. However, these shifts occur at
a declining rate as the holding costs for the more expensive,
less demanded items tend to counterbalance the effects of the
flat rate IPG I surcharge.
Percent of unit price IPG I surcharges affect the order
versus stock decision relatively evenly. In other words, on
all NSN wire charts, the NSN delta tends to plot roughly
linearly with percent surcharges levied, becoming
increasingly negative as percentages are raised. This
characteristic may be explained by frequently requisitioned,
high-priced items migrating into stock as the surcharge
percentage rapidly overshadows their costs for holding
inventory. As the percentage imposed increases, the less
frequently requisitioned, lower priced items slowly move into
stock.
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Combinations of flat rate per order and percent of unit
price IPG I surcharges revealed a variety of effects in
shifting NSNs from being ordered to their being stocked. The
most dramatic of these shifts occurred when flat rates of from
zero to ten or twenty dollars were combined with percentage
rates from zero to three to five percent . The wire charts
then flattened as the fixed and percentage cost continued to
increase
.
As flat rates were increased, the effects of percentage
surcharges became less and less pronounced. When flat rates
reached a level of seventy dollars, most NSNs were stocked
regardless of percentage surcharges. This trait resulted from
IPG I order costs becoming prohibitively expensive with the
addition of the flat rate surcharges. The effects of all
combinations of flat rates above thirty to forty dollars and
percentages above four to five percent were marginal because
most items had already migrated into stock.
Finally, it is important to note that when the percent
and fixed surcharges had risen to ten percent and one hundred
dollars, respectively, over ninety-five percent of all items
in each data base examined had been transferred into stock.
These surcharge values are the maximums shown in the wire
plots
.
The second set of graphs present the cost delta on the z
axis. This "delta" represents the difference (TVC -TVC S )
between IPG I order costs, (TVC ) , and the cost to stock,
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(TVCS ) . Again, these graphs are viewed from the corner
opposite to the origin.
All cost graphs' most positive points are associated with
no flat rates, and very low percentage rates (only one, two,
or three percent) . Oakland's, San Diego's, and both NADEPs
'
plots reveal definite ridges that peak at one to two, five to
six, and ten percent (Figures 20 through 23) . These ridges
are more pronounced with the supply depots' larger data bases
when no flat rates are applied. As the low and medium
percentages are combined with progressively higher flat rates,
these ridges tend to blend into the rest of the plot. For
Oakland, San Diego, and the two NADEPs, the ridge at ten
percent drops severely from no flat rate to one hundred
dollars. Although with no flat rate the cost delta at ten
percent is less than at nine percent, the reverse is true
when a one hundred dollar flat rate is added to both.
Both NSYs (Figures 24 and 25) exhibit mild peaks at one
and five percent that tend to disappear as flat rate
surcharges are combined with these percentages. Both charts
also share a fairly flat plateau at combinations of surcharges
greater than four or five percent and flat rates above twenty
dollars
.
Sharpe's plot (Figure 26) also contains a ridge, but at
six percent and no flat rate. This ridge is less pronounced,
but still noticeable, as flat rates are applied. Otherwise,
the graph slopes gradually to its most negative value at one
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OAKLAND IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT
















Figure 20. Oakland Three-Dimensional Cost Graph
87
SAN DIEGO SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT



















Figure 21. San Diego Three-Dimensional Cost Graph
NADEP ALAMEDA IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT
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Figure 22. NADEP Alameda Three-Dimensional Cost Graph
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NADEP NORTH ISLAND IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT















Figure 23. NADEP North Island Three-Dimensional Cost Graph
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MARE ISLAND NSY SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT












Figure 24. Mare Island NSY Three-Dimensional Cost Graph
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LONG BEACH NSY IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT


















Figure 25. Long Beach NSY Three-Dimensional Cost Graph
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SHARPE IPG1 SURCHARGE WIRE PLOT
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Figure 26. Sharpe Three-Dimensional Cost Graph
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hundred dollars and ten percent. In fact, at a surcharge of
ten percent there is very little change when higher flat rate
surcharges are applied as nearly all items are stocked.
The behavior of these cost deltas is peculiar. The
authors had anticipated relatively smooth wire plots similar
to the NSN graphs previously discussed. Possible explanations
for the interesting behaviors of these wire plots may include
the interplay of holding cost rates and order costs with IPG
I surcharges and the data. Another potential explanation may
lie in the differences between the deterministic model used in
this thesis and stochastic modelling. Stochastic models, an
example of which will be discussed in the next chapter, tend
to have a smoothing effect on this type of plot's behavior.
Study of these phenomena was not possible with the data
available. In addition, research of such depth was beyond
the scope of this thesis.
D. REQUISITIONS PER NSN INTERVAL TABLES AND POINTS OF
INTEREST
After the top IPG I customers had been identified for each
depot, programs were written to provide detailed information
by NSN for NADEPs Alameda and North Island, and Mare Island
and Long Beach NSYs . The output produced by these programs
was then analyzed to determine the number of requisitions per
NSN, and an indication of the types and quantities of
materials being ordered (Appendix E)
.
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The program was designed to produce an NSN list sorted by
number of requisitions submitted, in descending frequency,
for each NSN ordered, by each activity, during the year
under study. The output listings produced by these programs
were reviewed by the authors. Individual NSNs were grouped
into subsets by number of requisitions submitted per year.
The span of these subsets were ten-requisition intervals.
These intervals were designed to reveal if activities tended
to order the same NSNs, using IPG I, repetitively throughout
the year. Interval tables of these subsets and requisition
frequencies were then produced for each activity (Tables XI
through XIV)
.
Table XI. NADEP Alameda Requisitions Per NSN Interval.
# of Requisitions per NSN # o f Occurrences
70 + 4 (max value -= 140)
60 - 69 5
50 - 59 10
40 - 49 13
30 - 39 27
20 - 29 77
10 - 19 343
5 - 9 913





As shown in Table XI, NADEP Alameda had the highest number
of recurring requisitions of the four activities reviewed. In
addition, the authors' review of Alameda's NSN output
listings disclosed that the quantity of items ordered per
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Table XII. NADEP N. Island Requisitions Per NSN Interval
# of Requisitions per NSN # of Occurrences
3 0+ 1 (max value = 30)
20-29 8
10 - 19 435-9 1474-2 841
1 3, 058
Total 4,098
Table XIII. Mare Island NSY Requisitions Per NSN Interval
# of Requisitions per NSN # of Occurrences
30+
20-29 1 (max value = 22)
10-19 15-9 154-2 431
1 1,529
Total 1,977
Table XIV. Long Beach NSY Requisitions Per NSN Interval.
# of Requisitions per NSN # of Occurrences
30 +
20 - 29
10 - 19 3 (max value := 10)5-9 554-2 303
1 1,727
Total 2, 080
requisition appeared to be fairly low for these NSNs , rarely
exceeding three per order. Most of these NSNs were for engine
parts, packing and gasket materials. There were, however,
a few clear instances of ordering for bench stock. For
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example, 8,035 units were ordered on 23 separate requisitions
for one NSN, priced at forty-three cents each.
NADEP North Island (Table XII) exhibited basically the
same trends as Alameda, but with less highly repetitive
requisitioning of a few NSNs . Like Alameda, North Island
tended to order aircraft materials in fairly low quantities
and also had a few obvious cases of ordering bench stock using
IPG I.
The number of IPG I requisitions submitted during the
period studied by each NSY was approximately half the total
submitted by NADEP North Island, and less than one-third of
the total submitted by Alameda. As a result, the number of
repeat requisitions for a given NSN was fairly low. Both
shipyards tended to order generic industrial materials (pipe,
welding supplies and fittings) vice specific repair parts.
This ordering pattern makes it more difficult to determine
whether or not bench stocks are being ordered as these types
of materials may be ordered by the foot vice by the piece.
However, there appeared to be instances of bench stock
replenishment as both shipyards issued repetitive requisitions
for fairly large quantities of items such as circuit breakers.
Interestingly, four of the top five IPG I requisitions
ordered by Long Beach NSY were for compressed or liquified
gases. Gases are usually procured from commercial sources and
these IPG I requisitions seem to indicate a lack of discipline
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in management of Class III supplies (Class III includes
petroleum, oil, lubricants and gases)
.
When all four activities are grouped, the following trend
appears to be consistent. There were IPG I requisitions for
high-demand/low-cost items which seems to indicate these
requisitions were meant to replenish PEBs . The need to
replenish these PEBs using IPG I seems to indicate inadequate
inventory control procedures. PEB's normally use the standard
stochastic model with service levels and have two bins so that
when the first bin is empty an order will placed. The second
bin is the reorder point inventory.
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VI. THEORETICAL IPG I SURCHARGE EFFECTS MODEL
A. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION
The deterministic model developed for this thesis exploits
the data provided by the three supply depots in the fullest
manner possible. In addition, it provides a working baseline
from which to explore the implications of imposing an IPG I
surcharge. But, due to the limitations of the data, the
role of customer reorder point calculations could not be
addressed. Missing were accurate measures of customer lead
time and lead time demand. This lead time spans the time
interval from initial requirement definition through material
receipt by the requisitioner . In addition, a customer
backorder cost was not available and would be extremely
difficult to accurately estimate. However, since IPG I as a
requisition class is used to make the lead time as short as
possible, the shortage cost implied is high.
Lead time is a critical parameter in reorder point
calculations. An incorrect reorder point value can result in
either late arriving orders and therefore stockouts, or early
arriving orders creating excess stocks and perhaps
inefficiently large inventories. The reorder point is a level
to which inventory must fall to in order to trigger a
restocking requisition. Knowledge of lead time is necessary
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to ensure an order is received when desired, hopefully just
as stocks reach zero. Quantity demanded during the lead time
is also critical in reorder point calculations. Even if lead
time is known precisely, the quantity demanded during lead
time typically varies according to some probability
distribution
.
In the deterministic EOQ model, described in Chapter III,
both lead time and quantity demanded during lead time are
assumed to be known and constant. Therefore, the implicit
assumption is that the decision maker will always correctly
calculate the reorder point so that replenishment requisitions
will be received exactly when required. In reality, both
quantity demanded during lead time, and lead time itself,
can and do vary. Thus, a more precise model would allow lead
time, and quantity demanded during lead time, to vary by
relaxing the deterministic assumptions of knowledge and
consistency.
By studying the actual range, and frequency of occurrence
of each value in the range, the distribution characteristics
of both of these factors emerge. These characteristics form
the basis for generating a joint probability distribution that
reflects real world lead time and demand. Armed with this
joint distribution, a decision maker can calculate a reorder
point which incorporates the lead time and lead time demand
probabilities. In particular, a decision maker can evaluate
chances of stockout for a given reorder policy and develop
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safety stock levels to reduce this possibility to acceptable
levels
.
The level of safety stock carried is directly related to
the cost to an activity of being unable to fill a requirement
upon demand, in other words, the backorder cost. If that
cost is known, inventory managers can use well-known models
to find the optimal tradeoff between inventory holding costs
and backorder costs. If backorder costs are low and stockouts
can be tolerated, then the amount of safety stock carried
will be low. If backorder costs are high, the amount of
safety stock carried in inventory will also be high.
Unfortunately, backorder costs are never really known,
not even in the private sector. They are frequently based on
vague measures such as a decline in unit readiness, lost
production of output or completion delays. Therefore, a
quantitative backorder cost estimate often can only be implied
by assuming a theoretical model and then reviewing an
activity's ordering policies. In other words, the level of
safety stock which an activity is comfortable with provides an
indication of whether their backorder costs are high or low.
Since some sort of theoretical model is needed before the
backorder cost can be implicitly determined, we propose the
following model as a first step towards understanding how
inventory operating policies and backorder costs are related.
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B. VARIABLE LEAD TIME DEMAND SURCHARGE MODELLING
The stochastic model which provides a simple structure for
a stochastic IPG I surcharge model with variable lead time
demand is the stochastic model where stockouts result in lost
sales (Tersine '88) . This model would be appropriate if each
unit demanded when there is no stock is ordered IPG I at a
much faster rate than regular replenishment ordering. In
other words, in the event of a stockout, one-for-one
ordering would be done and therefore Q would be reduced by the
total expected amount of such orders. Under these conditions,
the optimal solution for how much to order, Q, and when to
order, B (the reorder point) , is an iterative procedure that
begins with the initial value of Q being determined using the
deterministic EOQ formula described in Chapter IV. This
deterministic formula is identical to equation 6 when E(M > B)
is set equal to zero. Equation 7 is used to derive the










Q = Economic Order Quantity in Units;
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R = Average Annual Demand in Units;
C = Ordering Cost per Order;
A = Stockout Cost per Unit;
E(M > B) = Expected Lead Time Stockout in Units;
H = Holding Cost per Unit per Year;
M^ = Maximum Lead Time Demand in Units;
M = Lead Time Demand in Units;
B = Reorder Point in Units; and
p(M) = Probability of Lead Time Demand of M Units.
After the order quantity has been determined it is used in
equation 8 to determine the optimal stockout probability if
the stockout cost per lost sale is known (Tersine '88)
.
P(M>B). nQ ; (8)AR+HQ
where
P(M > B) = Probability of a stockout just before the
requisitioned order of Q units arrives;
M = Lead Time Demand in Units (random variable)
;
B = Reorder Point in Units;
H = Holding Cost per Unit per year;
Q = Order Quantity (determined by Equation 6);
A = Backorder (Stockout) Cost per Unit; and
R = Average Annual Demand in Units.
This stockout probability is then used with the lead time
demand probability distribution to determine B.
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Reorder point determination begins by developing a table
based on lead time demand (M) , the corresponding probability
of occurrence p(M), and the computed probability of stockout
P(M > B) . An example is shown in Table XV.
Table XV. Example of a Probability of Stockout Table
























The calculated optimal stockout probability (i.e.,
calculated from the right-hand side of Equation 8) is matched
with the joint probability table to determine the reorder
point. For example, if the calculated optimal stockout
probability from equation 8 is .0017, the reorder point (B)
(from Table XV) would be set at eight units. Eight units
would be selected because it is the lowest potential reorder
point with a probability of stockout that is less than .0017.
The reorder point is then used in calculating the expected
lead time stockout in units (equation 7) . This expected lead
time stockout value is used in equation 6 to begin the second
iteration of the process to determine an optimal Q and B.
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However, equation 6 also needs a value for the backorder
cost
.
IPG I surcharges may be incorporated into this process by
using them as part of the backorder cost value. As noted
above, the assumption is made that the only time IPG I orders
will be submitted to the supply system will be when the
activity is out of stock and forced to reorder one-for-one
using high priorities (lower requisitioning priorities are
expected for routine stock replenishment orders)
.
Backorder costs for this model must be determined on a per
unit basis. The addition of percent of unit price surcharges
would be accomplished by multiplying the surcharge percentage
and unit price and adding this product, Sp/ to other
backorder costs to produce total backorder costs. The
addition of a flat rate surcharge, S f , would be accomplished
as in the thesis model of Chapter 5, by adding its value
directly to the other backorder costs. Thus, the formula for





These backorder costs would be incorporated in the
iterative process described throughout this section. Once an
optimal Q and B have been determined by the process, the
following equation may be used to determine annual total
variable costs to stock the items with surcharges:
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TVC=— [C+AE{M>B) } +H[®+(B-W> +E(M>B) ] (10)
where
R = Annual Demand in Units;
Q = Order Quantity (as determined by Equation 6);
C = Ordering Cost per Order;
A = Stockout Cost per Unit;
E(M > B) = Expected Lead Time Stockout in Units;
H = Holding Cost per Unit per Year;
B = Reorder Point in Units; and
M = Average Leadtime Demand in Units.
In summary, the model described in this chapter would be
more realistic and allow greater precision than the
deterministic EOQ model, where no backorders are allowed.
Unfortunately, the difficulties inherent in obtaining
probability distribution for lead time demand, for all items




VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The objective of this thesis was to examine the effects of
a DLA IPG I requisitioning surcharge on ordering decisions and
inventory management by retail activities. As discussed in
Chapter I, this study required data to be gathered from three
DDRW supply depots (Oakland, San Diego and Sharpe) for the
period from 1 June 1991 to 30 May 1992 (Sharpe was only able
to provide data from 1 January to 25 August 1992)
.
Chapter II discussed DoD's official IPG I policies and
requisition processing time standards. This chapter then
addressed actual retail customer IPG I ordering practices.
The remainder of the chapter was devoted to brief reviews of
each supply depot's history, and in-depth analysis of each of
their IPG I customer bases.
Alternatives to control IPG I requisitions were reviewed
in Chapter III. The chapter began by reviewing customer
reasons for using high priorities in requisitioning and the
differences between industrial and operational unit uses of
IPG I. Three alternatives to control IPG I requisitions
included (1) aggressive DLA enforcement of UMMIPS ceilings on
the percentage of total requisitions that may use IPG I; (2)
automatic downgrading of IPG I orders that do not cite
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required entries in various requisition data fields; and (3)
introduce IPG I requisition surcharges. These surcharges
could be restricted to certain types of customers, or imposed
only after a ceiling amount of IPG I requisitions, or
percentage of total requisitions submitted, is reached.
Evolution of the model developed to study the impact of
IPG I surcharges on customers was the subject of Chapter IV.
Projects completed for two NPS logistics courses were reviewed
in detail . These reviews were followed by a discussion of
requirements for the thesis model. These requirements
included development of a model sensitive to industrial
activities' needs. In addition, the model had to take into
account the limitations of the data provided by the supply
depots. These prerequisites dictated development of a model
based on the deterministic EOQ model. The model, and
parameter values used, was described in depth. This
description concluded by briefly examining the tradeoff
decision between continuing to order an item using IPG I, or
establishing stocking policies and bringing the item into
inventory
.
Chapter V began with an A-B-C analysis of each supply
depot's top customers. This analysis revealed that the Navy's
Oakland and San Diego depots support predominantly Navy
activities and the local industrial and aviation units were
the major customers. As a consequence, the slope of the A-B-
C curves were relatively steep. If such industrial units did
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not clearly dominate the list of top customers, as is the
case at Sharpe, the slope of the A-B-C curve is less steep.
Three-dimensional "wire plot" graphs were then constructed
based on the model described above to examine changes in items
stocked as IPG I surcharges were imposed. First, three-
dimensional graphs were plotted to study changes in number of
items carried for various IPG I surcharge combinations. These
plots were created for all three supply depots that provided
data, and both Oakland's, and San Diego's most prolific IPG
I customers (two NADEPs and two NSYs ) . The NSN graphs
disclosed that flat rate surcharges per IPG I order had a
significant impact at relatively low values (less than forty
dollars) . This impact diminished as this flat rate surcharge
increased. Percentage surcharges, on the other hand, tended
to have a relatively even impact on the order versus stock
decision as they were increased. Combinations tended to cause
most items to become stocked rapidly. After this initial
surge, the effects of surcharge combinations diminished
quickly as relatively few items were still being ordered.
Next, three-dimensional graphs were plotted of the
changes in costs as surcharges were applied. Unfortunately,
these were difficult to interpret. All plots exhibited peaks
and ridges that were not expected by the authors. Possible
reasons for this behavior included holding cost rates used,
and characteristics of the data. These peaks and ridges may
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also disappear with the use of more sophisticated stochastic
modelling techniques
.
The final analysis technique used was the development of
tables showing the numbers of IPG I requisitions submitted per
NSN for the year studied for NADEPs Alameda and North Island,
and Mare Island and Long Beach NSYs . These tables showed a
large number of repeat IPG I requisitions for some NSNs
,
especially by the NADEPs. Further review of the data revealed
that most of these orders appeared to be for quantities of
three or less and were for repair parts. There were,
however, some clear indications that Pre-Expended Bin (PEB)
items were being restocked using IPG I requisitions.
Chapter VI proposed a theoretical IPG I surcharge model
which provides for realistic random lead time demand. The
model suggested is a well-known lost sales model. The chapter
began by emphasizing that the most important requirement for
the model is data for determining the lead time demand
distribution. The chapter then presents the model and its
iterative solution process. It also shows how the "lost
sales" costs can be generated by the surcharges.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this
thesis. First, DoD's UMMIPS standards have been interpreted
in a wide variety of ways by both wholesale activities and
their retail customers. For example, our interviews indicate
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that many believe UMMIPS IPG I time standards are requirements
imposed upon the supply system. Actually, they are
performance averages that supply activities are expected to
meet. Therefore, some IPG I requisitions may be filled
faster than UMMIPS standards, while others may take longer to
be completed. In addition, industrial activities have been
extremely liberal in their interpretations of both IPGs and
FADs that they are allowed to use. DoD auditors have disputed
this interpretation in the past (DoD Audit Report #88-118)
.
In spite of this disagreement, industrial activities have
continued to feel required to generate large volumes of IPG I
requisitions to meet ambitious turnaround time requirements.
In this environment IPG I surcharges make sense. Unlike
the "cat and mouse" game currently being played by DLA through
their automatic downgrading policy, surcharges allow the
retail activity to decide whether IPG I responsiveness is
worth the additional premium they must pay in surcharge costs.
Depots would be less averse to handling these requisitions as
they would be compensated by the surcharge for the costs they
incur in providing IPG I responsiveness.
However, there is a significant downside to imposing
surcharges. First, an argument may be made that operational
units should be excused from paying IPG I surcharges. If
these units were excused, the surcharge mechanism could
rapidly become very complicated. For example, Navy
operational units are identified by "R" or "V" service
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designators. These designators are also used by MALS and
SIMAS, and may be used by NSYs to submit requisitions for
ships they are overhauling. How would DLA determine whether
a service designator is for a legitimate operating unit?
In addition, what if a retail customer has decided to
order using IPG I and accept the surcharge and they do not
receive their requisition in a timely manner? The supply
system is not required to meet UMMIPS time standards exactly,
but rather on the average. As described by one industrial
material manager (Wilcoxen '92), DLA already imposes a
surcharge to cover their overhead. If an additional IPG I
surcharge is imposed and paid, these requisitioners have a
right to expect increased responsiveness. If the supply
system is not reasonably responsive, these customers should
have a right to demand refunds of the IPG I surcharges they
paid. This refund process could also greatly complicate any
IPG I surcharge mechanism.
If DLA decides to go ahead with a surcharge policy, our
research indicates that a modest flat rate per order may be
the most effective and equitable. The greatest impact of this
type of surcharge is on repetitive requisitions for relatively
inexpensive items. These items can and should be stocked by
retail customers. Maintaining inventories of these items has
the additional benefit of improving the retail activity's
support of their own customers. In addition, modest flat
rates will probably not force expensive, low demand items
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into a retail customer's inventory. As holding costs for
these items are also expensive, it is more cost effective for
DoD as a whole to maintain consolidated inventories of these
items at the wholesale vice retail level.
Finally, a modest flat rate surcharge would be more
equitable because it can be easily tied to the additional cost
to the supply system of providing IPG I responsiveness. These
costs are probably not closely related to the price of an
item.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis presents additional evidence that IPG I, as
defined by UMMIPS, is incorrectly applied and overused.
There are several methods available to curb this abuse,
including IPG I surcharges. Our recommendations combine a
variety of these methods with a goal of insuring increased
efficiency within the supply system. A by-product of this
increased efficiency may be, but does not necessarily
include, a reduction in IPG I requisitioning.
The bottom line is that UMMIPS and its time standards
should be revised. The new system should clearly define and
segregate operational, industrial, and support activities.
Within each category, enforceable policies should be
developed to define which requirements are legitimately high
priority. As these activity types are very different, these
requirements will also be very different within each category.
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For operational units there are already inspection
mechanisms in place to insure rigid enforcement of IPG I
ordering standards. Therefore, they should be excused from
paying IPG I surcharges
.
The current policy in DoD under DBOF is to require
industrial and support activities to compete with each other
and the private sector as if these activities were commercial
firms. Imposing a surcharge for the increased responsiveness
of IPG I on these activities is consistent with this policy by
forcing these activities to pay for services received, and
allowing the supply system to recover the costs of the
services it provides. Supply system provision of IPG I
responsiveness is, in many ways, similar to a parts
wholesaler offering to ship items to customers using Federal
Express for an additional fee. In addition, this surcharge
policy would provide the incentive for these activities to
moderate IPG I ordering, eliminating inspection requirements.
Industrial and shore activities ordering using IPG I with
a surcharge should, however, receive some type of guarantee
that their ordered material will be delivered within a
specified time period. If the supply system fails to meet
this guarantee, these activities should be entitled to a
surcharge refund. In addition, these activities should be
allowed to compete the DLA supply system with the private
sector. In other words, if Lockheed can deliver a part
faster and cheaper than DLA can, NADEP Alameda should be
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allowed to buy the part from Lockheed and not be required to
use DLA. The amount of business generated by such actions is
a topic which lends itself to further research.
There are several aspects of the problem left unexplored.
First, all three supply depots also provided us with IPG II
and III data. At one time, our intention was to use this
data in our research. Unfortunately, due to time
constraints, we were unable to do so. The data remains
available at NPS for others to carry on this work. One aspect
would be to examine the effects of IPG I surcharges on lower
IPG ordering practices. Second, future modelling and
research efforts should attempt to reduce the infeasibility of
the stochastic model described in Chapter VI. To accomplish
this effort, demand data over several years will be required.
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APPENDIX A. TOP SEVENTY-FIVE OAKLAND UNITS
UIC #IPGI Regns Activity
1) 65885 7,500 Naval Aviation Depot, Naval Air Station,
Alameda, CA
2) 00221 1,977 Naval Shipyard, Mare Island, CA
3) 00296 1,706 Naval Air Station, Moffett Field,
Mountain View, CA
4) 00311 1,529 Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Pearl
Harbor, HI
5) 00334 1,462 Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI
6) 62758 1,319 Ship Repair Facility, Yokosuka, JA
7) 68251 1,182 Shore Intermediate Maintenance Facility,
Pearl Harbor, HI
8) 48758 1,109 Naval Air Pacific Repair Activity Plant
Detachment Office, Atsugi, JA
9) 00246 1,060 Naval Air Station, North Island, CA
10) 00251 1,040 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton,
WA
11) 21297 1,008 USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72)
12) 00620 999 Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, WA
13) 00236 912 Naval Air Station, Alameda, CA
14) 61577 868 Naval Air Station, Guam, MI
15) 62876 862 Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, RP
16) 68831 793 Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity,
San Francisco, CA
17) 62586 760 Ship Repair Facility, Guam, MI
18) 09124 714 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 24,
Kanoehe Bay, HI
19) 03362 666 USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62)
20) 63126 583 Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu,
CA
21) 60200 547 Naval Air Station, Cecil Field,
Jacksonville, FL
22) 09112 544 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 12
23) 60462 535 Naval Air Station, Adak, AK
24) 60259 491 Naval Air Station, Miramar, CA
25) 68212 468 Naval Air Facility, Misawa, JA
26) 65886 440 Naval Aviation Depot, Naval Air Station,
Jacksonville, FL
27) B2049 418 Sacramento Air Logistics Center,
McCellan Air Force Base, CA
28) 45598 415 Ship Repair Facility Detachment, Sasebo,
JA
29) 65923 405 Marine Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, NC
30) 09136 378 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 36
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31) 00421 357 Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River,
MD
Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, UT
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, HI
Navy Support Facility, Diego Garcia
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA
USS SAMUEL GOMPERS (AD-37)
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, VA
Naval Aviation Depot, Naval Air Station,
North Island, CA
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 11
(Rear) , 3rd MAW, MCAS El Toro, CA
Naval Air Repair Activity Detachment,
Kimhae, SK
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA
Naval Air Station, Brunswick, ME
Naval Air Pacific Repair Activity
Detachment, Singapore
Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, RP
Fleet Activities, Okinawa - Naval Air
Facility, Kadena Air Force Base
USS AMERICA (CV-66)
Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, FL
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69)
USS MCKEE (AS-41)
USS PELELIU (LHA-5)
Naval Supply Systems Command
Headquarters, Washington DC
Naval Air Station, Sigonella, IT
Ship's Parts Control Center,
Mechanicsburg, PA
Marine Corps Logistics Depot Barstow, CA
Charleston Naval Shipyard, Charleston,
SC
65889 207 Naval Aviation Depot, Naval Air Station,
Pensacola, FL
63042 206 Naval Air Station, Lemoore, CA
60191 203 Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia
Beach, VA
03359 194 USS FORRESTAL (CV-59)
09808 192 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39,
Camp Pendleton, CA
62863 191 Naval Station, Rota, SP
00188 183 Naval Air Station, Norfolk, VA
00275 181 Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, VA
00102 179 Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, NH
03341 178 USS MIDWAY (CV-41)
03368 173 USS NIMITZ (CVN-68)
20132 171 USS DIXON (AS-37)



























70) 03360 154 USS SARATOGA (CV-60)
71) 09114 154 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14
72) 00158 139 Naval Air Station, Willow Grove, PA
73) 58HOZ 108 Army Troop Aviation Systems Command,
Saint Louis, MO
74) 09116 103 Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16
(Rear) , 3rd MAW, MCAS Tustin, CA
75) 07351 102 USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
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Naval Aviation Depot, NAS North
Island, CA
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA
Naval Air Station, Miramar, CA
Naval Air Station, North Island,
CA
Pacific Missile Test Center,
Point Mugu, CA
Naval Air Station, Lemoore,
Marine Aviation Logistics
Squadron 24, Kanoehe, HI
USS AMERICA (CV-66)
Naval Air Station, Norfolk,
USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62)
Ship Repair Facility, Yokosuka,
JA
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field,
Jacksonville, FL





Squadron 11 (Rear), 3rd MAW,
MCAS El Toro, CA
Marine Aviation Depot, Cherry
Pt, NC
Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity, NavSta, Pearl Harbor,
HI
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72)




Squadron 16 (Rear), 3rd MAW,
MCAS Tustin, CA





Squadron 39, Camp Pendleton, CA

























































































USS DWIGHT D . EISENHOWER (C\
69)
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard,
Bremerton, WA
USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63)
Naval Air Station, Oceana,
Virginia Beach, VA
USS SARATOGA (CV-60)




Naval Air Station, Guam, MI
USS JASON (AR-8)
Naval Air Station, Sigonella, IT
Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
USS ANTIETAM (CG-54)
Naval Air Pacific Repair
Activity, Plant Reps Office,
Atsugi, JA
Supervisor of Shipbuilding,
Conversion & Repair USN,
NavSta, San Diego, CA
Marine Aviation Logistics
Squadron 31, Beaufort, SC
Naval Aviation Depot, NAS
Alameda, CA
Naval Air Facility, Atsugi, JA






Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent
River, MD
USS OKINAWA (LPH-3)
Naval Air Station, Fallon, NV
Ship Repair Facility Detachment,
Sasebo, JA
Naval Air Station, Barbers
Point, HI
USS MIDWAY (CV-41)
Naval Weapons Center, China
Lake, CA
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard,
Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL
Marine Aviation Logistics






















Naval Air Station, Dallas, TX
Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity, NavSta, Long Beach,
CA




Squadron 26, Jacksonville, NC
USS DAVID R. RAY (DD-971)
USS MCKEE (AS-41)
USS NIMITZ (CVN-68)
Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, HI
USS PRINCETON (CG-59)
Marine Corps Air Facility,
Quantico, VA
Ship Repair Facility, Guam, MI
USS ELLIOT (DD-967)
USS BUNKER HILL (CG-52)
Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity, NavSta, Norfolk, VA












7) W2 5PVR 748
8) WT4KD3 706
9) W62G2Q 630
10 ) W51HUU 590
11 ) WT4J8P 551
12 ) FB2049 547
13 ) W68NE3 503
14 ) W81H4F 486
15 I FB5205 471



















TMO Marine Corps Logistics Depot,
Barstow CA
177TH Armor Brigade, FT Irwin, CA
Army Troop Aviation Systems Command,
St Louis, MO
Consolidated Prop Act, Toole AFB, UT
USA Intel Center, FT Huachuca, AZ
FORSCOM Maint Fac FT Lewis, WA
USA Petroleum Cntr, New Cumberland,
PA
6th Spt Cntr, Taegu, SK
Consol Prop Office, Sacramento, CA
GEN SPT SEC Maint DIV DIO, FT
Carson, CO
7 02D Combat SPT BN STK REC ACCT
Tongduchon, South Korea
Sacramento ALC TIDS, McClellan AFB,
CA
HHC 181ST SPT BN Seattle, WA
CO B Minus MAINT 4 9 5TH CSMS, Helena,
MT
432 TTW LGS Misawa AB, Honshu JA
52 RMG LGS Osan AB South Korea
Consol Prop Off Texarkana, TX
19 SUPS LGS Kadena AB JA
ECS 16 CL IX Los Alamitos, CA
Ship Depot for Automatic Return
8 TFW LGS Kunsan AB South Korea
Consol Prop Off Anniston AL
USA MAT SPT CEN, Waegwan SK
C CO 3RD BN 68TH Armor FT Carson, CO
DOL FT Richardson, AK
NTC FT Irwin, CA
TMO Camp Pendleton CA
Comm Elect. Contr. Off. Far East,
Gumi, SK
Consol Prop Office Chambersburg, PA
Installation SPT UNIT CL IX, Camp
Roberts, CA
TMO Marine Corps Logistics Depot,
Albany, GA
DOL, FT Knox, KY














































Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Off. Far
East, Chang Won, SK
SPT CMD Schofield Barracks, HI
Mainz Army Depot, Mainz GR
FORSCOM Maint Facility FT Polk, LA
63 3 ABW LGS Anderson AB, Guam
USA INTEL CNTR, FT Huachuca, AZ
Auto Shop #1, FT Benning, GA
60 SUPS - LGSCD Travis AFB, CA
RMD, MCLB Barstow, CA
Comptroller, MCLB Albany, GA
NTC SSA FWD, FT Irwin CA
Consol Prop Officer, Tobyhanna, PA
M113 Cont Mgmt Off. Far East, Chang
Won, SK
340th CS BN, Schofield Barracks, HI
TMP, Starke, FL
DOL, FT Sill, OK
Naval Air Station North Island, San
Diego, CA
DOL, FT Bliss, TX
725th CS BN, Schofield Barracks, HI
HHC 1ST BN 70th AR, FT Polk, LA
31st Maint. Co. FT Irwin, CA
374 AW LGS Yokota AB, Honshu, JA
HHC 127th SIG BN, FT Ord, CA
707th CS BN FT Ord, CA
Asst. USPFO for Prop. Fairchild AFB,
WA
USA INTEL CNTR, FT Huachuca, AZ
23rd ENGR CO, FT Richardson, AK
9 9th SPT BN, FT Lewis, WA
123rd CS CO MATES, FT Irwin, CA
3666th CS CO, Phoenix, AZ
3rd LGS Elmendorf, AFB, AK
LG LGS 3 Elmendorf AFB, AK
93 SUPS, Castle AFB, CA
DOL, FT Campbell, KY
Corpus Christi Army Depot Corpus
Christi, TX
CO A 3RD BN 501ST AVN, Pyongtaek,
South Korea
62 MAW LGS McChord AFB, WA
00-ALC TID Hill AFB, UT
California Air Nat ' 1 Guard Base,
NAS Moffett Field, CA
25th AVN CO. Schofield Barracks, HI
219th CBT SPT BN, Leghorn, IT
DMM FT Monmouth, NJ
MALS 11, Santa Ana, CA
115th CS CO, Draper, UT
123
78 ) W81EU8 139
79 ) WT4GLR 138
80 ) W81HOW 130
81 ) W45CA1 128



















USA Material Support Cntr, Waegwan,
SK
501st AVN REGT PBO Pyongtaek, SK
CO B 145th SPT BN, Boise, ID
90th ARCOM, FT Sam Houston, TX
MALS 39, Camp Pendleton, CA
163rd LGS, March AFB, CA
85th CS CO, FT Lewis, WA
S&S Whse, FT Huachuaca, AZ
57th SUP SQ Nellis AFB, NV
4005th USAG, FT Hood, TX
CEGSWA, Doha, Kuwait
Fielding Team M88 CEV AVLB, FT
Stewart, GA
8th Log Command, Leghorn, IT
Consol Maint DIV, FT McCoy, WI
CEGSWA, Doha, Kuwait
177th SUP BN, FT Irwin, CA
782nd Maint BN, FT Bragg, NC
14th CBT EquipmentCO,
Moenchengladbach, GER
1113th Trans CO, Sacremento, CA
FOMS NO 5, Pineville, LA
Aircraft Maint Contract, FT Rucker,
AL
99th SPT BN, FT Lewis, WA
Aircraft Maint Contract 3, FT
Rucker, AL
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APPENDIX D. FOUR-COLUMN WIRE DIAGRAM OUTPUT
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FILE: OAKLAND DATA Al
FLAT PCNT COST NSN
SHCG SHCG DLTA DLTA
.00 478096 .37 4385
10 .00 451994 .83 -4577
20 .00 276311 .55 -11947
30 .00 151324 .62 -16495
40 .00 56219 .01 -19617
50 .00 -65310 .56 -22151
60 .00 -173234 .43 -24111
70 .00 -261597 .80 -25611
80 .00 -328436 .96 -26807
90 .00 -404428 .59 -27845
100 .00 -469750 .52 -28757
.01 1619067 .01 2843
10 .01 1386529 .67 -6865
20 .01 1090325 .67 -14395
30 .01 873236 .48 -18899
40 .01 684864 .99 -22025
50 .01 486059 .05 -24513
60 .01 287921 .63 -26331
70 .01 171709 .90 -27687
80 .01 21873 .43 -28889
90 .01 -50818 .48 -29791
100 .01 -160208 .37 -30741
.02 1534768 .79 407
10 .02 1193094 .18 -10001
20 .02 873514 .93 -17379
30 .02 672103 .02 -21549
40 .02 439139 13 -24837
50 .02 251244 38 -27027
60 .02 134066 .22 -28547
70 .02 27441 .49 -29829
80 .02 -110601 .48 -31011
90 .02 -284021 .87 -32019
100 .02 -455084 06 -33007
.03 1094447 79 -2237
10 .03 795340 01 -12915
20 .03 424378 30 -20421
30 .03 231271 17 -24225
40 .03 9136 52 -27309
50 .03 -191161 61 -29489
60 .03 -444238 03 -31549
70 .03 -565389 32 -32445
80 .03 -666048 22 -33205
90 .03 -738849 96 -33781
100 .03 -807131 77 -34401
.04 313591 16 -5435
10 .04 -20300 41 -16609
20 .04 -250937 32 -22931
30 .04 -481075 81 -27225
40 .04 -817201 38 -30925
50 .04 -933865 96 -32163
60 .04 -1019331 38 -33049
70 .04 -1099701 47 -33783
80 .04 -1177631 72 -34403
90 .04 -1243835 56 -34909
100 .04 -1333585 15 -35345
.05 974039 65 -7085
10 .05 377498 29 -19501
20 .05 -95922 66 -26025
30 .05 -628667 74 -31281
40 .05 -918897 21 -32771
50 .05 -1088066 58 -33773
60 .05 -1251310 87 -34545
70 .05 -1376552 35 -35173
80 .05 -1562371 77 -35685
90 .05 -1736947 15 -36111
100 .05 -1833363 50 -36415
.06 -1807078 07 -12975
10 .06 -2039008 70 -22857
20 .06 -2501070 08 -31341
30 .06 -2567342 35 -32985
126
FILE: OAKLAND DATA Al
40 .06 -2614095 .40 -33985
50 .06 -2676722 .27 -34887
60 .06 -2734030 02 -35577
70 .06 -2785735 65 -36117
80 .06 -2819413 .18 -36481
90 .06 -2863410 71 -36845
100 .06 -2908291 92 -37167
.07 -1408815 .91 -14361
10 .07 -1744528 .41 -25797
20 .07 -2072866 88 -32263
30 .07 -2145987 11 -33715
40 .07 -2229616 51 -34839
50 .07 -2312953 .54 -35707
60 .07 -2381397 07 -36315
70 .07 -2433233 47 -36735
80 .07 -2509770 90 -37199
90 .07 -2587707 60 -37603
100 .07 -2700896 06 -38077
.08 -991942 00 -15829
10 .08 -1510473 38 -30203
20 .08 -1664423 35 -33269
30 .08 -1784135 56 -34793
40 .08 -1912908 17 -35945
50 .08 -2004106 56 -36621
60 .08 -2112750 97 -37233
70 .08 -2263878 36 -37879
80 .08 -2390384 39 -38363
90 .08 -2492848 30 -38721
100 .08 -2583912 54 -39003
.09 -569677 84 -17387
10 .09 -1123003 73 -31943
20 .09 -1350355 58 -34811
30 .09 -1551085 74 -36345
40 .09 -1773849 08 -37441
50 .09 -2014755 66 -38337
60 .09 -2179361 38 -38863
70 .09 -2372292 16 -39357
80 .09 -2507100 08 -39665
90 .09 -2658108 12 -39973
100 .09 -2753048 62 -40153
.10 -157179 16 -19255
10 .10 -958087 71 -34811
20 .10 -1653366 61 -38111
30 .10 -2155127 10 -39429
40 .10 -2545432 94 -40149
50 .10 -2932273 42 -40683
60 .10 -3270582 63 -41057
70 .10 -3620967 42 -41377
80 .10 -3886960 23 -41581
90 .10 -4132133 47 -41745
100 .10 -4271639 19 -41839
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FILE: SANDIEGO DATA Al
FLAT PCNT COST NSN
SHCG SKCG DLTA DLTA
00 .00 369508 9516
10 .00 439298 4852
20 .00 414510 720
30 .00 398740 -2094
40 .00 597300 -4056
50 .00 374568 -5692
60 .00 565701 -7054
70 .00 556998 -8062
80 .00 542621 -8920
90 .00 555011 -9752
100 .00 514694 -10562
00 .01 1441262 8756
10 .01 1594704 5812
20 .01 1295954 -506
30 .01 1254776 -5552
40 .01 1155379 -5586
50 .01 1089658 -7056
60 .01 1020001 -8528
70 .01 987556 -9554
80 .01 942858 -10278
90 .01 878859 -11118
100 .01 858150 -11806
00 .02 1908551 7590
10 .02 1812495 2272
20 .02 1677018 -2090
30 .02 1566151 -4954
40 .02 1448990 -7150
50 .02 1574176 -8646
60 .02 1291540 -9884
70 .02 1219051 -10958
80 .02 1125588 -11948
90 .02 1007140 -12800
100 .02 918259 -15516
00 .03 2065657 6190
10 .03 1972057 524
20 .03 1799950 -4000
30 .05 1670985 -6804
40 .03 1561885 -8912
50 .03 1447055 -10552
60 .03 1266187 -12152
70 .03 1177809 -12972
80 .03 1114115 -15592
90 .03 1050576 -14144
100 .05 959654 -14720
00 .04 1751540 4562
10 .04 1650415 -1692
20 .04 1506654 -5922
30 .04 1564288 -3956
40 .04 1170421 -11542
50 .04 1096567 -12608
60 .04 1019651 -15482
70 .04 944176 -14186
80 .04 888602 -14748
90 .04 821560 -15508
100 .04 779786 -15754
00 .05 2440582 5504
10 .05 2150525 -5584
20 .05 1795868 -8142
30 .05 1420560 -11884
40 .05 1178067 -15162
50 .05 1006290 -14106
60 .05 872257 -14866
70 .05 659818 -15496
80 .05 490409 -16082
90 .05 550021 -16546
100 .05 286005 -16952
00 .06 256255 -596
10 .06 144266 -6520
20 .06 -148159 -12154
30 .06 -181007 -15448
128
FILE: SANDIflGO DATA Al
40 .06 -217215 -14426
50 .06 -266534 -15292
60 .06 -320073 -16008
70 .06 -364840 -16556
80 .06 -406992 -17010
90 .06 -459302 -17450
100 .06 -510401 -17836
00 .07 697822 -1258
10 .07 517655 -8332
20 .07 315895 -12828
30 .07 259099 -14172
40 .07 185866 -15278
50 .07 108556 -16146
60 .07 35585 -16822
70 .07 -38704 -17388
80 .07 -109472 -17860
90 .07 -185810 -18290
100 .07 -263560 -18676
00 .08 1163362 -2096
10 .08 857075 -11294
20 .08 752704 -13708
30 .08 635850 -15272
40 .08 510830 -16424
50 .08 392672 -17264
60 .08 293637 -17866
70 .08 157052 -18502
80 .08 33154 -19004
90 .08 -107589 -19492
100 .03 -216703 -19846
00 .09 1634814 -3000
10 .09 1282443 -12674
20 .09 1072636 -15320
30 .09 846831 -16984
40 .09 644366 -18040
50 .09 405892 -18960
60 .09 198897 -19624
70 .09 -34143 -20244
80 .09 -237526 -20702
90 .09 -481488 -21172
100 .09 -652378 -21476
00 .10 2092005 -4244
10 .10 1415773 -15638
20 .10 724352 -18812
30 .10 35536 -20494
40 .10 -481160 -21446
50 .10 -954894 -22102
60 .10 -1423817 -22606
70 .10 -1817930 -22980
80 .10 -2233058 -23302
90 .10 -2503282 -23502
100 .10 -2798513 -23684
129
I L E •- NADEPAL DATA Al
FLAT PCNT COST NSN
SHCG SHCG DLTA DLTA
00 .00 85904 202
10 .00 53809 -1450
20 .00 -14774 -2776
30 .00 -63054 -3576
40 .00 -119407 -4174
50 .00 -161748 -4644
60 .00 -218484 -5046
70 .00 -248600 -5328
80 .00 -270966 -5528
90 .00 -303750 -5720
100 .00 -322553 -5852
00 .01 134532 -306
10 .01 15038 -2186
20 .01 -90739 -3502
30 .01 -163021 -4304
40 .01 -228725 -4862
50 .01 -276436 -5304
60 .01 -333063 -5626
70 .01 -360733 -5858
80 .01 -391215 -6044
90 .01 -401075 -6152
100 .01 -427833 -6306
00 .02 -59174 -1186
10 .02 -185621 -3130
20 .02 -258580 -4264
30 .02 -305140 -4924
40 .02 -358513 -5474
50 .02 -393015 -5804
60 .02 -412210 -6018
70 .02 -427340 -6196
80 .02 -449461 -6352
90 .02 -493519 -6514
100 .02 -517154 -6642
00 .03 -224242 -1940
10 .03 -310624 -3774
20 .03 -387819 -4900
30 .03 -419966 -5422
40 .03 -451168 -5852
50 .03 -484715 -6168
60 .03 -531479 -6504
70 .03 -548538 -6606
80 .03 -559431 -6688
90 .03 -568383 -6734
100 .03 -576423 -6774
00 .04 -383466 -2670
10 .04 -465843 -4480
20 .04 -497632 -5274
30 .04 -532066 -5842
40 .04 -592433 -6440
50 .04 -611764 -6604
60 .04 -620036 -6682
70 .04 -631891 -6758
80 .04 -634394 -6798
90 .04 -638534 -6838
100 .04 -654684 -6888
00 .05 -353853 -3040
10 .05 -452087 -4868
20 .05 -512753 -5704
30 .05 -594134 -6500
40 .05 -617383 -6660
50 .05 -628465 -6754
60 .05 -638224 -6822
70 .05 -643808 -6868
80 .05 -657587 -6924
90 .05 -666667 -6950
100 .05 -669781 -6980
00 .06 -637345 -4044
10 .06 -670061 -5272
20 .06 -744046 -6508
30 .06 -751714 -6672
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: ILE: NADEPAL DATA Al
40 .06 -757306 -6772
50 .06 -762754 -6848
60 .06 -766794 -6900
70 .06 -772334 -6952
80 .06 -775978 -6986
90 .06 -779705 -7016
100 .06 -781939 -7036
00 .07 -614512 -4252
10 .07 -661692 -5698
20 .07 -710843 -6586
30 .07 -720465 -6748
40 .07 -726531 -6834
50 .07 -733885 -6910
60 .07 -740160 -6964
70 .07 -745825 -7006
80 .07 -749734 -7034
90 .07 -754487 -7062
100 .07 -762191 -7096
00 .08 -588993 -5886
10 .08 -666106 -6410
20 .08 -681244 -6696
30 .08 -690697 -6822
40 .08 -702835 -6930
50 .08 -711005 -6990
60 .08 -717137 -7030
70 .08 -728153 -7080
80 .08 -735013 -7110
90 .08 -743577 -7140
100 .08 -749306 -7160
00 .09 -562394 -4712
10 .09 -635473 -6546
20 .09 -656239 -6820
30 .09 -675028 -6964
40 .09 -688536 -7040
50 .09 -702675 -7098
60 .09 -716206 -7144
70 .09 -732025 -7186
80 .09 -738741 -7204
90 .09 -747874 -7224
100 .09 -758459 -7244
00 .10 -537878 -5008
10 .10 -625672 -6820
20 .10 -669588 -7060
30 .10 -705186 -7168
40 .10 -741066 -7236
50 .10 -777549 -7290
60 .10 -812288 -7326
70 .10 -838749 -7352
80 .10 -863197 -7374
90 .10 -880816 -7388
100 .10 -894504 -7400
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"ILE: NADEPNI DATA Al
FLAT PCNT COST NSN
SHCG SHCG DLTA DLTA
00 .00 31167 296
10 .00 25307 -606
20 .00 360 -1438
30 .00 -12406 -1882
40 .00 -25164 -2196
50 .00 -37292 -2478
60 .00 -50163 -2698
70 .00 -62627 -2854
80 .00 -69858 -2968
90 .00 -73817 -3056
100 .00 -79686 -3134
00 .01 75177 200
10 .01 53794 -780
20 .01 25677 -1602
30 .01 2582 -2080
40 .01 -15281 -2400
50 .01 -32344 -2680
60 .01 -44782 -2870
70 .01 -50610 -2986
80 .01 -59214 -3098
90 .01 -67407 -3188
100 .01 -84604 -3290
00 .02 73268 20
10 .02 43970 -1024
20 .02 15137 -1838
30 .02 -10969 -2292
40 .02 -33205 -2650
50 .02 -47976 -2886
60 .02 -59417 -3040
70 .02 -71047 -3170
80 .02 -84691 -3290
90 .02 -100810 -3406
100 .02 -117258 -3500
00 .03 54502 -200
10 .03 25018 -1308
20 .03 -11011 -2108
30 .03 -33752 -2546
40 .03 -54208 -2888
50 .03 -74250 -3122
60 .03 -104789 -3362
70 .03 -111123 -3440
80 .03 -115460 -3494
90 .03 -123942 -3540
100 .03 -128649 -3588
00 .04 39757 -442
10 .04 2351 -1642
20 .04 -24889 -2348
30 .04 -53323 -2838
40 .04 -89580 -3250
50 .04 -100857 -3374
60 .04 -107415 -3460
70 .04 -116275 -3526
80 .04 -120217 -3568
90 .04 -125376 -3612
100 .04 -131194 -3638
00 .05 51508 -612
10 .05 -3300 -1934
20 .05 -43781 -2654
30 .05 -88329 -3250
40 .05 -102913 -3390
50 .05 -111747 -3480
60 .05 -118138 -3552
70 .05 -128087 -3602
80 .05 -133756 -3642
90 .05 -134959 -3662
100 .05 -136356 -3676
00 .06 -10251 -1124
10 .06 -36614 -2204
20 .06 -94879 -3220
30 .06 -101591 -3364
132
-ILE : NADEPNI DATA Al
40 .06 -108038 -3470
50 . 06 -115567 -3560
60 .06 -121663 -3622
70 .06 -123978 -3652
80 .06 -126236 -3676
90 .06 -127901 -3694
100 .06 -131241 -3718
00 .07 -205 -1250
10 .07 -39709 -2544
20 .07 -81253 -3300
30 .07 -89450 -3440
40 .07 -99437 -3556
50 .07 -107786 -3634
60 .07 -111214 -3668
70 .07 -112401 -3684
80 .07 -118256 -3720
90 .07 -127550 -3764
100 .07 -132031 -3786
00 .08 11288 -1406
10 .08 -55088 -3122
20 .08 -69386 -3390
30 .08 -83148 -3550
40 .08 -93492 -3642
50 .08 -98563 -3682
60 .08 -105479 -3722
70 .08 -116507 -3772
80 .08 -123280 -3800
90 .08 -130143 -3824
100 .08 -139380 -3852
00 .09 22055 -1604
10 .09 -44998 -3272
20 .09 -68133 -3552
30 .09 -81757 -3662
40 .09 -91609 -3716
50 .09 -109206 -3790
60 .09 -122957 -3834
70 .09 -134747 -3866
80 .09 -144806 -3890
90 .09 -157028 -3916
100 .09 -158793 -3922
00 .10 29232 -1870
10 .10 -49131 -3502
20 .10 -94076 -3754
30 .10 -129524 -3858
40 .10 -151672 -3908
50 .10 -169491 -3940
60 .10 -187659 -3964
70 .10 -203148 -3982
80 .10 -224088 -4002
90 .10 -240075 -4016
100 .10 -244090 -4022
133
ILE: MINSY DATA Al
FLAT PCNT COST NSN
SHCG SHCG DLTA DLTA
00 .00 11508 21
10 .00 5740 -487
20 .00 -1150 -845
30 .00 -8216 -1091
40 .00 -13389 -1243
50 .00 -19879 -1371
60 .00 -26825 -1477
70 .00 -30989 -1533
80 .00 -32809 -1571
90 .00 -35992 -1617
100 .00 -37144 -1643
00 .01 20496 -35
10 .01 13106 -557
20 .01 4102 -933
30 .01 -5460 -1171
40 .01 -15060 -1335
50 .01 -21744 -1457
60 .01 -28029 -1541
70 .01 -29617 -1579
80 .01 -37804 -1633
90 .01 -42838 -1681
100 .01 -46500 -1721
00 .02 27349 -73
10 .02 16655 -613
20 .02 -2306 -1043
30 .02 -12835 -1263
40 .02 -26473 -1445
50 .02 -33760 -1549
60 .02 -35843 -1593
70 .02 -40409 -1651
80 .02 -49210 -1715
90 .02 -56105 -1761
100 .02 -59899 -1789
00 .03 21094 -137
10 .03 5451 -725
20 .03 -15410 -1171
30 .03 -24605 -1367
40 .03 -33999 -1529
50 .03 -41871 -1615
60 .03 -55923 -1737
70 .03 -57729 -1761
80 .03 -59890 -1785
90 .03 -63141 -1809
100 .03 -64809 -1825
00 .04 15762 -249
10 .04 -5214 -885
20 .04 -18302 -1249
30 .04 -33421 -1503
40 .04 -51504 -1699
50 .04 -54373 -1733
60 .04 -58012 -1773
70 .04 -60207 -1797
SO .04 -62714 -1819
90 .04 -64896 -1835
100 .04 -67492 -1853
00 .05 12223 -357
10 .05 -11274 -1015
20 .05 -27526 -1389
30 .05 -48941 -1687
40 .05 -53555 -1739
50 .05 -60042 -1783
60 .05 -62814 -1811
70 .05 -65282 -1831
80 .05 -67378 -1849
90 .05 -69968 -1867
100 .05 -70990 -1875
00 .06 -3774 -553
10 .06 -20934 -1153
20 .06 -53819 -1701
30 .06 -56026 -1747
134
ILE: MINSY DATA Al
40 .06 -57836 -1777
50 .06 -61364 -1815
60 .06 -64301 -1841
70 .06 -66327 -1857
80 .06 -68340 -1871
90 .06 -69839 -1881
100 .06 -72163 -1893
00 .07 -9075 -673
10 .07 -30866 -1355
20 .07 -51628 -1721
30 .07 -54785 -1771
40 .07 -58390 -1811
50 .07 -62169 -1843
60 .07 -66109 -1869
70 .07 -67136 -1877
80 .07 -70771 -1895
90 .07 -73512 -1907
100 .07 -73790 -1909
00 .08 -8912 -749
10 .08 -44595 -1643
20 .08 -51070 -1757
30 .08 -55185 -1805
40 .08 -61459 -1853
50 .08 -64485 -1873
60 .08 -69496 -1897
70 .08 -72252 -1909
80 .08 -73897 -1915
90 .08 -76958 -1925
100 .08 -78214 -1929
00 .09 -9803 -845
10 .09 -45253 -1715
20 .09 -53693 -1811
30 .09 -60619 -1861
40 .09 -67846 -1897
50 .09 -73076 -1917
60 .09 -77427 -1921
70 .09 -79682 -1935
80 .09 -82055 -1941
90 .09 -84359 -1947
100 .09 -85094 -1949
00 .10 -12924 -991
10 .10 -52308 -1807
20 .10 -69033 -1901
30 .10 -77043 -1929
40 .10 -80118 -1937
50 .10 -82055 -1943
60 .10 -85263 -1951
70 .10 -88692 -1955
80 .10 -97246 -1963
90 .10 -97176 -1963
100 .10 -102668 -1967
135
ILE : LBNSY DATA Al
FLAT PCNT COST NSN
SHCG SHCG DLTA DLTA
00 .00 10444 44
10 .00 5027 -470
20 .00 -2980 -870
30 .00 -13146 -1178
40 .00 -18644 -1346
50 .00 -24803 -1488
60 .00 -32802 -1608
70 .00 -37289 -1686
80 .00 -41603 -1750
90 .00 -44401 -1792
100 .00 -48315 -1838
00 .01 19799 8
10 .01 10499 -520
20 .01 -1143 -958
30 .01 -12016 -1250
40 .01 -19853 -1424
50 .01 -28022 -1574
60 .01 -34132 -1672
70 .01 -41051 -1756
80 .01 -46124 -1806
90 .01 -50886 -1856
100 .01 -55635 -1898
00 .02 23026 -48
10 .02 11911 -614
20 .02 -3612 -1048
30 .02 -16169 -1340
40 .02 -26077 -1526
50 .02 -34343 -1660
60 .02 -42577 -1766
70 .02 -50017 -1836
80 .02 -58619 -1904
90 .02 -63123 -1938
100 .02 -72356 -1990
00 .03 19393 -122
10 .03 8007 -702
20 .03 -11005 -1170
30 .03 -22776 -1444
40 .03 -34438 -1648
50 .03 -47677 -1798
60 .03 -66345 -1944
70 .03 -68281 -1966
80 .03 -69865 -1982
90 .03 -71942 -1996
100 .03 -73096 -2006
00 .04 18329 -190
10 .04 399 -856
20 .04 -18256 -1322
30 .04 -34940 -1618
40 .04 -62952 -1920
50 .04 -66014 -1950
60 .04 -68193 -1974
70 .04 -69085 -1986
80 .04 -70365 -1998
90 .04 -74461 -2016
100 .04 -74754 -2020
00 .05 14133 -300
10 .05 -6364 -992
20 .05 -29827 -1478
30 .05 -65133 -1912
40 .05 -68675 -1954
50 .05 -71210 -1980
60 .05 -73005 -1996
70 .05 -74203 -2008
80 .05 -75994 -2022
90 .05 -76376 -2026
100 .05 -77287 -2032
00 .06 -208 -462
10 .06 -19519 -1158
20 .06 -64927 -1902
30 .06 -67787 -1950
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40 .06 -69437 -1974
50 .06 -71439 -1996
60 .06 -72638 -2008
70 .06 -74768 -2024
80 .06 -74832 -2026
90 .06 -76600 -2036
100 .06 -77213 -2040
00 .07 -5067 -574
10 .07 -34943 -1418
20 .07 -64751 -1930
30 .07 -67049 -1966
40 .07 -70152 -1998
50 .07 -71073 -2008
60 .07 -73597 -2026
70 .07 -75351 -2036
80 .07 -75957 -2040
90 .07 -77221 -2046
100 .07 -78153 -2050
00 .08 -9276 -686
10 .08 -59060 -1860
20 .08 -64440 -1954
30 .08 -68395 -1996
40 .08 -70107 -2012
50 .08 -73331 -2032
60 .08 -74260 -2038
70 .08 -76584 -2048
80 .08 -78214 -2054
90 .08 -78813 -2056
100 .08 -80626 -2062
00 .09 -14607 -834
10 .09 -60393 -1920
20 .09 -66368 -1992
30 .09 -71445 -2028
40 .09 -73141 -2038
50 .09 -76642 -2052
60 .09 -77759 -2056
70 .09 -80530 -2064
80 .09 -80410 -2064
90 .09 -81155 -2066
100 .09 -81045 -2066
00 .10 -21750 -1030
10 .10 -64994 -1986
20 .10 -73817 -2042
30 .10 -77162 -2056
40 .10 -78160 -2060
50 .10 -84873 -2070
60 .10 -85654 -2072
70 .10 -88249 -2074
80 .10 -88179 -2074
90 .10 -88109 -2074
100 .10 -91986 -2076
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I LE : SHARPE DATA Al
FLAT PCNT COST NSN
SHCG SHCG DLTA DLTA
00 .00 106136 -4145
10 .00 -30572 -11969
20 .00 -176829 -17421
30 .00 -284292 -20487
40 .00 -379715 -22535
50 .00 -458719 -24015
60 .00 -519839 -25097
70 .00 -570523 -25875
80 .00 -625414 -26567
90 .00 -675507 -27111
100 .00 -711307 -27523
00 .01 228195 -5627
10 .01 17604 -13805
20 .01 -191281 -19251
30 .01 -339567 -22259
40 .01 -453717 -24219
50 .01 -552261 -25607
60 .01 -625966 -26569
70 .01 -683225 -27309
80 .01 -738844 -27865
90 .01 -777689 -28225
100 .01 -827987 -28607
00 .02 99738 -7613
10 .02 -159153 -16345
20 .02 -382545 -21523
30 .02 -543374 -24309
40 .02 -659362 -26135
50 .02 -780478 -27499
60 .02 -857536 -28289
70 .02 -930622 -28881
80 .02 -980194 -29245
90 .02 -1006402 -29441
100 .02 -1030859 -29621
00 .03 -47784 -9997
10 .03 -356927 -19073
20 .03 -565004 -23855
30 .03 -757968 -26803
40 .03 -884420 -28279
50 .03 -950339 -28953
60 .03 -989068 -29295
70 .03 -1020256 -29535
80 .03 -1042624 -29717
90 .03 -1065362 -29879
100 .03 -1086565 -29997
00 .04 -250157 -12741
10 .04 -555507 -21813
20 .04 -799319 -26593
30 .04 -953322 -28655
40 .04 -993106 -29149
50 .04 -1038815 -29555
60 .04 -1068486 -29779
70 .04 -1101079 -29985
80 .04 -1120577 -30125
90 .04 -1147540 -30231
100 .04 -1179899 -30319
00 .05 -526848 -15243
10 .05 -853552 -24917
20 .05 -1080284 -28763
30 .05 -1117051 -29295
40 .05 -1163537 -29771
50 .05 -1193649 -30021
60 .05 -1216537 -30195
70 .05 -1241763 -30343
80 .05 -1264210 -30453
90 .05 -1287237 -30555
100 .05 -1310565 -30643
00 .06 -523174 -17155
10 .06 -963495 -27925
20 .06 -1079390 -29455
30 .06 -1148971 -29997
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40 .06 -1199863 -30299
50 .06 -1243694 -30505
60 .06 -1275952 -30627
70 .06 -1306857 -30725
80 .06 -1340816 -30821
90 .06 -1366133 -30891
100 .06 -1390555 -30947
00 .07 -972930 -22281
10 .07 -1510937 -29753
20 .07 -1567423 -30435
30 .07 -1604364 -30723
40 .07 -1624922 -30851
50 .07 -1655057 -30977
60 .07 -1682509 -31073
70 .07 -1697628 -31119
80 .07 -1707480 -31149
90 .07 -1729798 -31197
100 .07 -1743339 -31225
00 .08 -1282043 -24607
10 .08 -1773988 -30675
20 .08 -1836821 -31083
30 .08 -1864110 -31197
40 .08 -1887131 -31271
50 .08 -1914539 -31325
60 .08 -1928771 -31355
70 .08 -1938591 -31367
80 .08 -1962333 -31393
90 .08 -1978386 -31413
100 .08 -2000349 -31439
00 .09 -1942485 -28661
10 .09 -2102896 -31337
20 .09 -2127325 -31427
30 .09 -2141169 -31455
40 .09 -2163441 -31489
50 .09 -2172340 -31499
60 .09 -2186924 -31513
70 .09 -2194234 -31519
80 .09 -2197143 -31521
90 .09 -2203297 -31525
100 .09 -2203171 -31525
00 .10 -2321729 -31549
10 .10 -2321848 -31551
20 .10 -2321851 -31551
30 .10 -2321854 -31551
40 .10 -2321857 -31551
50 .10 -2321861 -31551
60 .10 -2321864 -31551
70 .10 -2321867 -31551
80 .10 -2321870 -31551
90 .10 -2321873 -31551
100 .10 -2321876 -31551
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TYPE. _FREQ_ UPRICE ANNUALD NUMREQNS EOQR
7500 8557941.10 1160879 25165 816969
L 4.40 172 140 82
L 46.42 125 108 22
L 25.50 196 94 37
L 45.21 124 70 22
L 5780.00 69 69 2
L 3050.00 66 66 2
L 1300.00 65 65 3
L 17.50 66 62 26
L 179.98 120 61 11
L 90.00 178 57 19
L 58.00 60 57 13
L 461.70 68 56 5
L 47.32 140 55 23
L 1300.00 54 54 3
L 5.60 58 53 42
L 162.00 72 53 9
L 223.00 70 51 7
L 43.50 178 51 27
L 117.98 161 50 15
L 51.00 58 49 14
L 2450.00 48 48 2
L 8.10 48 47 32
L 12.00 47 47 26
L 34.90 63 47 18
L 9.50 48 45 30
L 126.19 53 44 9
L 13.69 46 44 24
L 160.77 46 43 7
L 5.60 46 43 38
L 1111.93 45 43 3
L 159.00 59 41 8
L 55.17 154 40 22
L 18.50 104 38 31
L 33.50 40 38 14
L 431.00 42 38 4
L 94.04 153 38 17
L 0.01 119 37 1439
L 1.03 63 37 103
L 279.00 92 36 8
L 91.00 37 35 8
L 1600.00 40 34 2
L 300.22 40 34 5
L 87.00 64 33 11
I 47.98 101 33 19
L 798.00 37 33 3
87.77 54 33 10
L 4.40 36 33 38
4.68 35 32 36
L 18.54 42 32 20
115.00 31 31 7
55.10 31 31 10
11.04 59 31 30
3.62 51 31 49
71.00 110 31 16
375.00 36 31 4
136.00 30 30 6
81.35 30 30 8
74.05 57 30 12
14.71 36 30 21
L 7180.00 29 29 1
4.20 29 29 35
8.70 44 29 30
14.21 37 28 21
3.70 56 28 51
9.70 28 28 22
34.50 31 28 13
0.59 240 28 266
54.00 43 27 12
372.00 89 27 6
1220.00 27 27 2
88.00 84 27 13
98.74 32 27 8
3.99 40 27 42
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